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Articles
ENFORCING VICTIMS’ RIGHTS IN ILLINOIS:
THE RATIONALE FOR VICTIM “STANDING”
IN CRIMINAL PROSECUTIONS
Lawrence Schlam*
“It's moving from a two-ring circus to a three-ring circus that
was never contemplated as part of the public justice
system. . . .”1

*
J.D., New York University. Professor of Law, Northern Illinois University College of
Law. The author wishes to gratefully acknowledge the encouragement and helpful
thoughts of my colleague, Professor Marc Falkoff, and to express appreciation for the
invaluable research assistance of Noah Menold (J.D., NIU 2014), Daniel Kalina (J.D., NIU
2014), and Matthew Peterson (J.D., NIU 2015).
Sadly, this Article is appearing posthumously. Professor Lawrence
Schlam passed away suddenly in March 2015. Larry was an expert in
state and federal constitutional law, as well as a founding member of
the law school at Northern Illinois University. Among his many
virtues, he was a fierce advocate for the rights of victims of crime. In a
landmark case, he represented a stalking victim who was denied an
opportunity to make a statement prior to the court’s acceptance of a
plea bargain by the defendant. See People v. Johnson, 12 CF 76
(DeKalb Cnty., Ill. Oct. 5, 2012) (establishing that a crime victim has
standing and may intervene in a criminal matter in order to vindicate
statutory victim’s rights). Not satisfied with winning his case, Larry
used People v. Johnson as a vehicle for communicating to the legal
community the inordinate difficulties that crime victims faced in
having their voices heard in court. See, e.g., Lawrence Schlam, Victim
Participation in Criminal Proceedings Makes Good Sense, CHI. DAILY L.
BULL., May 21, 2014, available at http://www.niu.edu/law/calendar/
news_items/2014/Reprint%20NIU%20Schlam%20CDLB%2014%2005
%2021a.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/GJC5-FMDM (advocating for
passage of a state constitutional amendment clarifying their right to
standing). When the Illinois Crime Victims’ Bill of Rights Amendment
was passed by an overwhelming majority of voters on November 4,
2014, the new constitutional provision became a part of Professor
Schlam’s enduring legacy.
Memorial written by Marc Falkoff, Associate Professor, Northern Illinois University
College of Law.
1
Josh Weinhold, Victims’ Rights Amendment Resurfaces in Legislature, CHI. DAILY L.
BULL., Jan. 22, 2013, at 1 (quoting James R. Covington III, ISBA Director of Legislative
Affairs). Put another way, the complaint about standing for victims is that “victims
contesting violations of their rights could delay or complicate criminal cases and clash with
defendants' rights to a speedy trial.” Id. (quoting Matthew P. Jones, Office of The Appellate
Prosecutor, Associate Director for Administration).
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I. INTRODUCTION
In 1993, after growing pressure from victim’s advocacy groups, the
Illinois Constitution was amended to provide a substantial list of rights
to which victims of crimes would thereafter be entitled.2 This was
followed by legislation executing the constitutional amendment, which
added a requirement that the State notify victims of or facilitate their
rights.3 The enforcement of victims’ rights, therefore, was delegated
solely to prosecutors, who could potentially—and often actually did—fail
in their statutory duty due to inadvertent nonfeasance or overly
conservative use of prosecutorial discretion.4 Thus, for more than
twenty years, with at least one recorded exception, it has remained less
than clear whether crime victims have “standing” to independently
enforce their own rights should the statutorily mandated process fail.5
See infra Part II.B (discussing victims’ rights in Illinois).
See ILL. CONST. art. I, § 8.1 (noting Article I, Section 8.1 of the Illinois Constitution is
not self-executing). The clause is, however, executed by the Rights of Crime Victims and
Witnesses Act. 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. 120/4 (2010) [hereinafter “the Act”]. The Act affords
victims of violent crime the same rights afforded by the Illinois Constitution and several
additional rights. Id.; see also 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. 120/4.5(b)(9) (2010) (“[The prosecutor]
shall inform the victim of the right to have present at all court proceedings, subject to the
rules of evidence, an advocate or other support person of the victim's choice, and the right
to retain an attorney, at the victim's own expense, who, upon written notice filed with the
clerk of the court and State's Attorney, is to receive copies of all notices, motions and court
orders filed thereafter in the case, in the same manner as if the victim were a named party
in the case[.]”). “In Illinois, a proposed constitutional Crime Victim's Rights amendment
was placed on the ballot . . . after approval by the House on a 1170 vote and after
overwhelming approval by the Senate. . . . The Illinois amendment passed with over threefourths voter approval.” Jeffrey A. Parness, Laura Lee & Karen Blouin, Monetary Remedies
for Victims During Illinois Criminal Cases, 44 VAL. U. L. REV. 69, 73–74 (2009) (citations
omitted).
4
725 ILL. COMP. STAT. 102/4.5(b); see ROBERT C. DAVIS ET AL., SECURING RIGHTS FOR
VICTIMS: A PROCESS EVALUATION OF THE NATIONAL CRIME VICTIM LAW INSTITUTE’S
VICTIMS’ RIGHTS CLINICS 12 (2009) (finding that victims’ rights were infringed). Despite
passage of crime victims’ rights laws:
[A]dvocates have been dismayed to see that, too often, victims’ rights
were violated with impunity. [A] survey of crime victims in 1998
found that, even within states with strong victims’ rights legislation,
many victims were not notified about key hearings and proceedings,
many were not given the opportunity to be heard, and few received
restitution. . . . [A]s many as one-third of victims in strong-protection
states were not afforded the opportunity to exercise certain rights.
Id. (citations omitted).
5
See, e.g., People v. Johnson, 12 CF 76 (DeKalb Cnty., Ill. Oct. 5, 2012) (granting
standing and intervention in a criminal case to a victim). In that litigation, a petitionerintervener alleged that she had:
[E]xpressed to the State’s Attorney her desire to exercise her [victims’
rights but] no one from the [State’s] Attorney’s Office spoke to [her]
2
3
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They continue to be without clear recourse in Illinois to the traditional
“check” on nonfeasance or malfeasance by public officials—standing to
seek judicial review of perceived deprivations of expressed rights.6
Over the past two years, however, legislative and political efforts
were made to again amend the Illinois Constitution, this time specifically
to provide crime victims “standing”—a right to participate directly in
criminal prosecutions to vindicate denied constitutional rights.7 An
prior to the plea agreement . . . nor did the State inform her that the
condition of electronic monitoring [was removed by a prior court order
and, had the State] consulted with her prior to this date [of the prior
court order,] she would have attended that hearing . . . and presented a
victim impact statement that would have included, among other
things, her desire to have the defendant continue to be placed on
electronic monitoring. . . .
Id. She also alleged that “[i]ntervention is necessary because the [State’s Attorney]
informed [her] that he will not assert her rights or seek a remedy on her behalf.” Id.; see
Am. Crime Victim’s Mot. to Intervene for the Ltd. Purposes of Asserting Constitutional and
Statutory Rights of Crime Victims and Seeking Remedies for Violations of Those Rights,
People v. Johnson, 12 CF 76 (DeKalb Cnty., Ill. Jun. 8, 2012) (on file with author).
6
See Proposals for a Constitutional Amendment to Provide Rights for Victims of Crime:
Hearing Before the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 104th Cong. 242 (1996) (statement of Laurence
H. Tribe, Professor, Harvard Law School) (noting that the problem with statutory rights for
victims is that they “provide too little real protection whenever they come into conflict with
bureaucratic habit, traditional indifference, sheer inertia, or any mention of an accused's rights
regardless of whether those rights are genuinely threatened.” (emphasis added)). “Properly
understood, crime victims' rights are not barriers to an effectively functioning criminal
justice system, but rather an important part of such a system. Crime victims' rights form
part of the checks and balances that ensure a properly functioning criminal justice process.”
Paul G. Cassell & Steven Joffee, The Crime Victim's Expanding Role in a System of Public
Prosecution: A Response to the Critics of the Crime Victims' Rights Act, 105 NW. U. L. REV.
COLLOQUY 164, 181 (2011); see also Susan Bandes, Victim Standing, 1999 UTAH L. REV. 331,
343 (1999) (“[T]he discretion given to prosecutors, thanks to a host of current doctrines, is
virtually unlimited. [Thus there] is room for more judicial supervision without running the
risk of stripping prosecutors of all their discretion.” (footnotes omitted)); Mary Margaret
Giannini, Note, The Swinging Pendulum of Victims’ Rights: The Enforceability of Indiana’s
Victims’ Rights Laws, 34 IND. L. REV. 1157, 1167 (2001) (“The strength of many states' victims'
rights laws are immediately hampered by the absence of any direct method to remedy
victims' rights violations, coupled with a lack of mandatory language to enforce those
rights.”).
7
See, e.g., H.R.J. Res. Constitutional Amendment 00001, 98th. Gen. Assemb. (Ill. 2014),
available at http://www.ilga.gov/legislation/BillStatus_pf.asp?DocNum=1&DocTypeID
=HJRCA&LegID=68225&GAID=12&SessionID=85&GA=98, archived at http://perma.cc/
ZD74-HN6Y [hereinafter Amendment] (proposing to amend the Illinois Constitution
regarding victims’ rights). According to its synopsis, the bill:
Proposes to amend the Bill of Rights Article of the Illinois Constitution
concerning crime victim's rights. Provides that in addition to other
rights provided in the Constitutional provision, a crime victim has the
right to: (1) be free from harassment, intimidation, and abuse; (2)
refuse to disclose information that is privileged or confidential by law;
(3) timely notification of all court proceedings; (4) be heard at any
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early bill, introduced in 2012, was opposed by several interested parties,
including the Illinois State Bar Association.8 For this, and perhaps other
reasons, the bill did not move forward that session, but resurfaced again
in the legislature early in 2013.9 The same interests, again, resisted
passage of the bill and it failed to reach the ballot.10 However, a
substantially similar bill was introduced again in March of 2014 and,
having been overwhelmingly approved as a joint resolution on April 10,
2014, it was ratified by the citizens of Illinois on last November’s ballot.11
Objections to bills introduced earlier—difficulties hypothetically
anticipated—were misguided.12 Allowing “victim standing” is already
within the inherent power of the judiciary, and would simply be ratified
or reaffirmed by any “victim standing” amendment.13 Moreover, the
experience with victim standing as a matter of positive law in other
proceeding involving a post-arraignment release decision, plea,
sentencing, post-conviction or post-adjudication release decision, and
any post-arraignment proceeding in which a right of the victim is at
issue; (5) receive a report related to the defendant's sentence when
available to the accused; and (6) have the safety of the victim and the
victim's family considered in denying or fixing the amount of bail,
determining whether to release the defendant, and setting conditions
of release after arrest and conviction. Provides that a victim, victim's
lawyer, or the prosecuting attorney may assert the victim's constitutional
rights in court. Provides that nothing in this Constitutional provision
creates any cause of action for compensation or damages against the
State, any political subdivision of the State, any officer, employee, or
agent of the State or of any of its political subdivisions, or any officer
or employee of the court. Effective upon being declared adopted.
Id. (emphasis added).
8
See Chris Bonjean, ISBA Position Paper on House Joint Resolution for Constitutional
Amendment No. 29, ILL. STATE B. ASS’N (Apr. 26, 2012), available at http://iln.isba.org/
blog/2012/04/26/isba-position-paper-house-joint-resolution-constitutional-amendmentno-29, archived at http://perma.cc/84AK-DLVZ (objecting to the problems that might arise
from adding another “party” to criminal prosecutions); see also Illinois Victims’ Rights
Amendment Stalls After Sudden Turnaround in Legislative Support, HUFF. POST (May 7, 2012),
available
at
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/05/07/illinois-victims-rights-a_n_
1496118.html, archived at http://perma.cc/E52M-QTBL (noting that a bill amending the
Illinois Constitution to allow victim standing has been “stalled”).
9
See Weinhold, supra note 1, at 1.
10
See id. (“[The] Illinois State Bar Association (ISBA), the state's attorneys appellate
prosecutor's office and Cook County State's Attorney Anita M. Alvarez raised concerns
about offering victims a role in the traditional two-party criminal justice process. Their
objections persuaded the House to hold off on sending the amendment to the November
ballot.”).
11
Amendment, supra note 7.
12
See infra Part V (discussing implied standing in states without any victim standing
provisions in their constitution).
13
See infra Part V (providing the judicial balancing of interests in the victim standing
provisions).
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jurisdictions has by now revealed none of the difficulties anticipated by
opponents.14 Finally, if ratified, victim standing will improve the
transparency of—and improve victims’ faith in—the criminal justice
system.15 Thus, there was no legal or practical basis for the citizens of
Illinois to have not ratified and approved this amendment.16 It will
simply assure the enforcement of existing statutory rights of victims and
build greater public confidence in our criminal justice system.
Of course, a few knowledgeable attorneys—and some scholars—
have suggested several potentially negative impacts of victim
participation in criminal prosecutions.17 As one commentator has noted:
Part and parcel of prosecutorial discretion is the
prosecutor's duty “to seek justice, not merely to
convict.” Ideally, a prosecutor pursues justice not only
for the victims in an individual case, but also for the
public and the defendant. Treating the victim's concerns
as paramount elevates the private individual above the
public—the very opposite of what our criminal justice
system seeks to achieve. Washington Supreme Court
Justice James M. Dolliver summed up this concept aptly:
“emphasizing the conflict between the victim and the accused
and placing the victim in the role of a quasi-prosecutor or co-

14
See infra Part VI (presenting jurisdictions that allow victim standing in their
constitutions).
15
See infra Part V.C (contributing the possibility of a renewed faith in the criminal justice
system).
16
See infra Part VI (explaining the jurisdictions that allow victim standing in their
constitutions).
17
Weinhold, supra note 1, at 1. See e.g., Tyrone Kirchengast, Victim Lawyers, Victim
Advocates, and the Adversarial Criminal Trial, 16 NEW CRIM. L. REV. 568, 582–83 (2013)
(“Submissions made by private counsel acting for the best interest of victims may not
accord with the views of the community as a whole. It is feasible that where victim lawyers
[are] present, the decisions made by prosecutors on pretrial matters and on the evidence
presented during trial may disproportionately take the victims' views on board in order to
diminish any contestation between their own views and those of victims' counsel.
Depending on the reasonableness of the submission made by victims' counsel, this may or
may not be acceptable. [Victim] evidence may prejudice the objectivity of the prosecutor,
given the highly emotive and at times unchallengeable testimony that such evidence may
supply.” (footnote omitted)). “This position may be challenged[, however,] out of
recognition that victim interests may be raised alongside those of the state without
compromising the integrity of the prosecution process, or the entire due process of the
common law.” Id. at 573.
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counsel . . . represents a dangerous return to the private
blood feud mentality.18
The problem, though, is these criticisms seem to reflect a
misperception of the impact or effect of “victim standing” as being
equivalent to granting a victim “party” status.19 To the contrary, the
victim or her advocate will not, for example, be engaging in direct and
cross-examination of witnesses, or routinely raising objections to
evidence in open court. Critics, therefore, have presupposed a treatment
of and role for victims not contemplated by the advocates of “victim
standing.”20
In fact, in none of the several jurisdictions in which crime victims
have standing has it been used for purposes other than moving or
This limited
petitioning to vindicate expressed victims’ rights.21
18
See Danielle Levine, Comment, Public Wrongs and Private Rights: Limiting the Victim's
Role in a System of Public Prosecution, 104 NW. U. L. REV. 335, 352–53 (2010) (emphasizing the
particular assumptions about the effect and operation of victim standing that are simply
not true) (emphasis added) (footnotes omitted); see also Kirchengast, supra note 17, at 582–
83 (discussing victims’ rights). Kirchengast states:
[There has been] widespread criticism . . . that the victim will detract
from processes directly aimed at affording defendants a due process
through which to challenge accusations of wrongdoing, levelled by the
state. The integration of victims [might also respond] to a political
imperative to appease the interests of a sectarian, vocal, and special
needs group in a way that defies the defendant's right to procedural
fairness and due process of law. The [additional] fear is that victim
participation will invite potentially subjective and thus prejudicial
submissions on matters of state concern.
Id. at 569–70.
19
Jon Kyl et al., On the Wings of Their Angels: The Scott Campbell, Stephanie Roper, Wendy
Preston, Louarna Gillis, and Nila Lynn Crime Victims' Rights Act, 9 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 581,
617 (2005) (contrasting participant and party). The victim's right to “standing” “is
independent of the government and that the victim exercises [that right] not through the
prosecutor or the courts but rather as an independent participant. While the role of a
‘participant’ may be legally distinguishable from that of a ‘party,’ participants are afforded
the rights and the standing to assert them . . . even if they are not parties to a case.” Id.
(footnote omitted).
20
Weinhold, supra note 1, at 1 (quoting Jennifer Bishop-Jenkins, victims’ rights
advocate). Jennifer Bishop-Jenkins states:
“[V]ictims don't need lengthy court proceedings to address their
concerns.” If a right gets violated, . . . a victim could petition the judge
to review the situation—a process similar to filings made by witnesses
who don't want to testify. “All we're asking for is the same ability to
make a motion request to the judge, with regards only to the very
limited number of rights that we have.”
Id.
21
See, e.g., State v. Lamberton, 899 P.2d 939, 941 (Ariz. 1995) (holding that a victim did
not have standing to challenge a trial court’s motion for post-conviction relief). In
Lamberton, the court acknowledged that under Arizona law victims have the right to be
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participation has, in practice, created no significant impediment to the
efficient operation of the traditional criminal process. In fact, any
potential conflicts with rights of defendants or prosecutorial discretion
have been reasonably and expeditiously resolved by judges presiding in
such proceedings. Finally, since victims already exercise existing rights to
be present at all proceedings, object to potential violations of their
privacy, and speak at sentencing, it is not clear what additional
“prejudice” to defendants, if any, would result if victims may now
directly motion or petition trial courts to remedy denial of victims’ rights.
This Article argues that Illinois courts are already justified in
implying victims’ standing to enforce their expressed rights—in the
absence of prosecutorial action or otherwise—though most courts
apparently still feel the need for explicit legislative support.22 Second,
vindication of victims’ rights is best accomplished through direct and
immediate participation in criminal proceedings, rather than by filing
separate “lawsuits” as suggested in the legislative debates.23 Third,
substantial, persuasive precedent in several other jurisdictions with
victims’ rights provisions reveal that courts that have adjudicated
motions to enforce victims’ rights have avoided any significant
impediments to the criminal justice system.24 Finally, this Article
concludes that, given the apparently continuing dissatisfaction among
victims with the criminal justice system, the Illinois legislature, as a
matter of sound public policy, appropriately enacted and submitted for
ratification the constitutional “standing amendment” and it was sensibly
ratified on last November’s ballot.25 The amendment will simply allow
victims to “intervene” not as “parties,” but solely to vindicate their
rights.26

heard at criminal proceedings, but the court stated that “we cannot conclude that victims
are ‘parties’ with the right to file their own petitions for review.” Id. As a result, in order for
victims to have standing to challenge the actions of the trial courts, victims must assert relief
for the rights denied them. Id. at 942.
22
Implications of victim standing in criminal prosecutions, though often appropriate,
are rare. See, e.g., People v. Johnson, 12 CF 76 (Dekalb Cnty., Ill. Oct. 5, 2012) (illustrating
one decision personally litigated by the author that granted standing and intervention to a
victim in a criminal case); see infra Part III (implying victim standing to assert and vindicate
their unenforced rights in Illinois as a matter of statutory interpretation).
23
See infra Part IV.C (implying victim standing in criminal prosecutions and the analogy
of third party intervention in criminal prosecutions).
24
See infra Part VI (discussing jurisdictions that already have statutes and constitutional
amendments similar to the Illinois proposed Victim’s Rights Act).
25
See DAVIS ET AL., supra note 4, at 80 (explaining that the purpose of a victim’s rights
amendment would broker a relationship “with dissatisfied victims”).
26
See Amendment, supra note 7 (proposing to amend the Illinois Constitution regarding
victims’ rights). The pending amendment read as follows:
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Part II briefly discusses the history, motivations, and
accomplishments of the “movement” for victim’s rights; the political and
legislative history leading to Article I, Section 8.1 of the Illinois
Constitution; and the most recent successful effort to enact the
constitutional “victims’ standing” bill to protect victims’ rights.27 Part III
focuses on how and why crime victim “standing” may be implied from
existing law, even without the amendment, as a matter of Illinois
statutory interpretation.28 Part IV describes the arguments for moving
from the existing reasonable implication of victim standing to request
relief, at least in part from legislative history, to the justification for
effective and efficient remedies, such as direct participation rather than
independent litigation.29 Part V discusses the experience with implying
standing in states without expressed victim standing while balancing the
interests of the usual parties to the prosecution.30 Part VI discusses the
“The victim has standing to assert the rights enumerated in subsection
(a) in any court exercising jurisdiction over the case. The court shall
promptly rule on a victim’s request. The victim does not have party
status. The accused does not have standing to assert the rights of a
victim. The court shall not appoint an attorney for the victim under
this Section. Nothing in this Section shall be construed to alter the
powers, duties, and responsibilities of the prosecuting attorney.
Id. The amendment would delete the portion that reads, “[t]he General Assembly may
provide by law for the enforcement of this Section. Id. “When the [victims’ rights
constitutional] amendment passed, . . . [o]pponents protested that the amendment was a
waste of time, as there could always be statutory protections [yet the] Illinois amendment
passed with over three-fourths voter approval.” Parness et al., supra note 3, at 74 (footnotes
omitted). Perhaps this was because, according to the current Act’s sponsor, Illinois State
Rep. Louis I. Lang, D-Skokie, “[v]ictims of crimes have rights today, but under the law,
many of those rights are unenforceable. Unless it's in the constitution, those rights will
continue to be ignored in many courtrooms.” Weinhold, supra note 1, at 1; see also DAVIS ET
AL., supra note 4, at 11 (“A constitutional amendment . . . provides a level of permanency to
the victims’ rights, since they can be changed only by another cumbersome . . . amendment
process[, and] constitutional rights offer a level of implied enforceability.” (emphasis added));
David Schuman, The Right to a Remedy, 65 TEMPLE L. REV. 1197, 1208 (1992) (suggesting that
one of the reasons victim standing requires constitutional status is that any “remedy
guarantee applies only to those causes of action in existence at the time the guarantee
became part of the constitution . . . but has no effect on subsequently created causes of
action. Thus, a legislature cannot eliminate remedies for trespass or breach of contract.
[But it would have] a free hand . . . with respect to remedies for . . . modern inventions . . . .”
(emphasis added)). These “modern inventions” would presumably include victims’ rights
statutes.
27
See infra Part II (explaining the movement of victims’ rights from history to recent
successes).
28
See infra Part III (addressing victim standing and how it can be interpreted).
29
See infra Part IV (describing a shift in victim standing relief from legislative history to
direct participation).
30
See infra Part V (balancing the interests of various parties in states without expressed
victim standing).
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precedent from jurisdictions that have expressly granted crime victims
standing as a matter of positive law.31 This Part demonstrates the
successful resolution of a cross-section of actual conflicts between
victims and defendants or prosecutors regarding claims of violation of
victims’ rights.32 Part VII analyzes the preceding Parts and suggests, as
indicated earlier, that victim standing may be judicially implied and, if
courts presently appear to be hesitant about doing so, this inherent
judicial power should be ratified by the voters.33 It also suggests that
any constitutional amendment articulating and ratifying that power
would not, in practice, interfere with prosecutorial or judicial discretion,
the rights of criminal defendants, or impede the administration of
criminal justice.34
The Article concludes that, given this amendment, the Illinois
judiciary will more frequently and justifiably exercise their inherent
power to imply victim standing, in the absence of prosecutorial action or
otherwise.35 Further, that the judiciary is more than capable of guarding
against possible “impediments” to criminal justice by limiting victim
standing to situations where such impediments actually present
Additionally, and perhaps most important, is the
themselves.36
ratification of the constitutional standing amendment which will benefit
crime victims, and increase public confidence—and participation—in the
system of criminal justice.37 Finally, an additional needed legislative
initiative should be to articulate, as a rule of court, forms that have been
successfully used elsewhere to confirm that victims’ rights have been
respected, as well as template pleadings for use in requesting limited
victim participation (intervention) to vindicate rights.38
II. THE CRIME VICTIMS’ RIGHTS MOVEMENT
“The victim is no longer [merely] an unfortunate citizen who
has been on the receiving end of a criminal harm, and whose

31
See infra Part VI (explaining the precedent jurisdiction and their successes in resolving
conflicts between victims and defendants).
32
See infra Part VI (discussing victims’ rights).
33
See infra Part VII (analyzing parts I–VI).
34
See infra Part VII (analyzing the conflicts between victims’ rights and defendants’ due
process rights).
35
See infra Part VIII (concluding the analysis and thesis of this Article).
36
See infra Part VIII (approving the legislature’s abilities to protect victims’ rights).
37
See infra Part VIII (concluding that the Victims’ Standing Constitutional Amendment
is beneficial).
38
See infra Part VIII (providing support to the Victims’ Standing Constitutional
Amendment).
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concerns are subsumed within the ‘public interest’ that guides
the prosecution and penal decisions of the state.”39
A. Generally
In English common law, all crimes except treason were subject to
private prosecution. Crimes against persons and property were
identified as torts or “wrongs,” with the victim having the primary
responsibility to prosecute them since the harm was seen as a private,
rather than a social harm.40 However, by the time of the Revolutionary
Era, there was an increasing recognition of the social harm caused by
crime. This led to the establishment of public prosecutors in virtually
every colony—and to a shift away from private involvement in the
criminal justice system.41 Still, even though the public justice system was
established early in the colonies, it was not the only or even predominant
means of maintaining law and order.42 Indeed, private prosecution was
the "dominant" form of criminal prosecution in colonial America.43 This
system of "private justice" was preferred, in part, because courts were
generally in the capitals of the colonies, and it was difficult to travel to
them long distances over poor roads.44 For this reason, and because
restitution, if any, went directly to the victim and not the state, private
prosecution actually continued in the United States well into the second
half of the nineteenth century.45

DAVID GARLAND, THE CULTURE OF CONTROL: CRIME AND SOCIAL ORDER IN
CONTEMPORARY SOCIETY 11 (2001).
40
See Douglas E. Beloof, Weighing Crime Victims’ Interests in Judicially Crafted Criminal
Procedure, 56 CATH. U. L. REV. 1135, 1138 (2007) (“Even after identification and arrest, the
victim carried the burden of prosecution. He retained an attorney and paid to have the
indictment written and the offender prosecuted.” (quoting William F. McDonald, Towards a
Bicentennial Revolution in Criminal Justice: The Return of the Victim, 13 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 649,
652 (1976))).
41
See generally, Giannini, supra note 6, at 1159–60 (discussing the nature of early private
prosecution and the transition to public prosecution).
42
See Bruce L. Benson, Comment, The Lost Victim and Other Failures of the Public Law
Experiment, 9 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 399, 427 (1986) (explaining the justification of the
public involvement in law and order).
43
See Cassell & Joffee, supra note 6, at 178 (2011) (“[A]t the state level, private
prosecution extended well into the nineteenth century.”).
44
See Benson, supra note 42, at 400 (explaining why private justice was used).
45
See Cassell & Joffee, supra note 6, at 177–81 (providing a lengthy discussion of
substantial evidence of private prosecution of crimes until at least 1875). See ALLEN
STEINBERG, THE TRANSFORMATION OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PHILADELPHIA, 1800–1880 (1989),
for a comprehensive review of nineteenth century criminal prosecution in Philadelphia, the
only American city for which such a record has been compiled.
39
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The public prosecutorial system became increasingly more
significant, however, “for both philosophical and practical reasons.”46
The earlier “philosophical” thinking during the European “Age of
Enlightenment” emphasized the larger societal interests of “deterrence,
rehabilitation, and retribution,” rather than the private interests of the
victim.47 Also, as a practical matter, the increasing development of
professional, governmental systems of prosecution was accompanied by
a redirection of prosecutorial focus—“the interests of the victim were
[now] subsumed by the interests of society.”48
The movement away from private to public prosecution, of course,
had many positive effects for citizens. It meant greater egalitarian justice
with increasing numbers of prosecutions and prosecutions that were
“properly conducted.”49 However, “the pendulum [may have] swung
too far.”50 By the late 1960s and early 1970s, it became clear that “victims
had been relegated solely to the role of witnesses—mere evidence for the
state—and . . . the only harm of crime was [more clearly and
emphatically] seen as the harm to the public at large.”51 Increasingly,
crime victims felt marginalized.52 Academic studies showed that victim
dissatisfaction with the criminal justice system directly impacted their
willingness to report crimes and cooperate in their prosecution.53 As a
result, in the 1970s, a multi-pronged social movement began, one
described as one of the most successful “civil liberties movements of
recent times.”54 It focused on the status of crime victims in the criminal
justice system.55 Survivors of crime and their advocates began to

Levine, supra note 18, at 338.
Id.
48
Id.
49
See Joanna Tucker Davis, The Grassroots Beginnings of The Victims’ Rights Movement,
NCVLI NEWS (2005), available at http://law.lclark.edu/live/files/6453-the-grassrootsbeginnings-of-the-victims-rights, archived at http://perma.cc/8M8D-JRKP (discussing the
beginnings of the victims’ rights movement).
50
Id.
51
Id.; see also Mary L. Boland & Russell Butler, Crime Victims' Rights: From Illusion to
Reality, 24 CRIM. JUST. 4, 5 (2009) (discussing the role of the civil rights work of the 1960s
and 1970s).
52
See e.g., Paul G. Cassell, Balancing the Scales of Justice: The Case for and the Effects of
Utah's Victims' Rights Amendment, 1994 UTAH L. REV. 1373, 1375 (stating that crime victims
“have come to believe that the criminal justice system is out of balance, that their voices are
not heard, and that the system is preoccupied with defendant's interests and rights”).
53
See Davis, supra note 49 (giving examples of different organizations that crime victims
established because of their unwillingness to cooperate with prosecution).
54
Boland & Butler, supra note 51, at 5 (citing John W. Gillis and Douglas E. Beloof, The
Next Step for a Maturing Victim Rights Movement: Enforcing Crime Victims Rights in the
Courts, 33 MCGEORGE L. REV. 689, 691 (2002)).
55
Davis, supra note 49.
46
47

https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol49/iss3/7

Schlam: Enforcing Victim's Rights in Illinois: The Rationale for Victim

2015]

Enforcing Victims’ Rights in Illinois

609

establish “grassroots” crime victims’ organizations.56 Indeed, some of
the country’s most notable victims’ advocacy organizations were
established during that time as crime rates hit an all-time high.57
An additional impetus for advocating for victims’ rights came from
the fact that female victims, in particular, saw increasingly more negative
outcomes when seeking to invoke the criminal justice system. For
example, in Linda R. S. v. Richard D., a district attorney had refused, on a
mother’s complaint, to institute an action against her out-of-wedlock
child’s father because, in the prosecutor’s view, fathers of illegitimate
children fell outside the scope of the non-support enforcement statute.58
Regardless of the merits of any equal protection claim, the U.S. Supreme
Court held that the mother had no standing to sue.59 That is, she had
failed to show that enforcement of the statute would actually result in
support of her child, rather than merely the jailing of the child’s father.60
However, more portentous in “motivating” the movement was the Linda
R. S. court’s dictum that “a private citizen lacks a judicially cognizable
interest in the prosecution or non-prosecution of another.”61
However, nearly two decades later the movement achieved one of its
most important, early judicial victories—the Supreme Court's decision in
Payne v. Tennessee.62 There, the Court overruled its earlier decisions in
Booth v. Maryland and South Carolina v. Gathers, holding that victim
impact statements were admissible at capital sentencing hearings.63 This
Id.
See Marlene A. Young, Exec. Dir., Nat’l Org. for Victim Assistance, Address at the
First National Symposium on Victims of Federal Crime: The Victims Movement: A
Confluence of Forces (Feb. 10, 1997), available at http://www.trynova.org/wpcontent/uploads/file/victimsmovement.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/W4PS-GUPK
(addressing the history of how crime victims movement has changed over the years); see
also Boland & Butler, supra note 51, at 5 (“The first National Crime Survey in 1972 (now
renamed the National Crime Victimization Survey) identified crime rates much higher than
those reported to law enforcement in the FBI's Uniform Crime Reports. The tremendous
toll of crime on its victims emerged into social consciousness.”).
58
Linda R. S. v. Richard D., 410 U.S. 614, 615–16 (1973) (providing the prosecutor’s
reasoning). The district attorney had refused, on the mother's complaint, to institute an
action against her child's father because, in the prosecutor’s view, fathers of illegitimate
children fell outside the scope of the statute. Id. The court held that the mother failed to
show that enforcement of the statute would actually result in support of her child rather
than merely in the jailing of the child's father, and that “a private citizen lacks a judicially
cognizable interest in the prosecution or nonprosecution of another.” Id.
59
Id. at 619.
60
Id. at 618.
61
Id. at 619.
62
See Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 808 (1991) (holding that the Eighth Amendment
did not bar prohibiting a capital sentence jury from considering victim impact evidence).
63
Booth v. Maryland, 482 U.S. 496, 496 (1987) (holding that introducing victim impact
statements at capital punishment sentencing violated the Eight Amendment); South
56
57
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was, said the court, one of the “new procedures and new remedies” the
state was free to “devise” to “meet felt needs.”64 As a result of Payne,
many states now allow victim impact statements in capital cases, and
they are allowed almost universally in non-capital cases.65 Payne
ameliorated the dictum in Linda R. S. by suggesting that “Congress may
enact statutes creating legal rights, the invasion of which creates
standing, even though no injury would exist without the statute.”66
This background provided much of the legal foundation and social
impetus for victims’ rights legislation in the states and, ultimately, for
victim standing to participate in prosecutions. State and federal
statutes—as well as constitutional amendments—have been enacted in at
least thirty-three states providing victims’ rights.67 Many victims'
advocates, however, felt that this legislation was largely ineffective due

Carolina v. Gathers, 490 U.S. 805, 812 (1989) (finding that it was an improper argument to
make when commenting on victim’s religious tract and personal characteristics); see Payne,
501 U.S. at 827 (1991) (stating that “if the [s]tate chooses to permit the admission of victim
impact evidence and prosecutorial argument on that subject, the Eighth Amendment erects
no per se bar”). Victim impact statements provide victims the opportunity to testify about
the harm they have experienced as a result of the crime. Compare Paul G. Cassell, In Defense
of Victim Impact Statements, 6 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. LAW 611, 611–48 (2009) (discussing the
justifications for victim impact statements), with Boland & Butler, supra note 51, at 6
(discussing case law indicating that the permissible scope of victim impact statements in
capital cases continues to be an issue in the courts), and Kirchengast, supra note 17, at 575
(“Victim impact evidence has . . . been widely criticized both as being of limited evidential
value to the sentencing court and as providing victims only the slightest measure of
participation in the criminal trial process.” (footnote omitted)), and Bryan Meyers & Edith
Greene, The Prejudicial Nature of Victim Impact Statements: Implications for Capital Sentencing
Policy, 10 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & LAW 492, 492–515 (2004) (addressing the psychological
issues of using victim impact statements).
64
Payne, 501 U.S. at 825.
65
See Legal Issues: States That Allow Victim Impact Statements, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR.,
available at http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/legal-issues-states-allow-victim-impactstatements (last visited Oct. 8, 2014), archived at http://perma.cc/VUS2-AX87 (displaying
the states that allow victim impact statements). But see Kirchengast, supra note 17, at 570–71
(stating that on the other hand, “victim impact statements have been criticized as limited
and ineffective, and as an adjunct to the criminal trial from which the victim continues to
be excluded. The general criticism of impact evidence is that it affords a role for victims too
late in the prosecution process, long after important decisions have been made regarding
charge, indictment, plea, discovery of evidence, and potentially, mode of trial.” (footnote
omitted)).
66
Linda R. S., 410 U.S. at 617 n.3 (citing Trafficante v. Metro Life Ins. Co., 409 U.S. 205,
212 (1972) (White, concurring) and Hardin v. Ky. Util. Co., 390 U.S. 1, 6 (1968)).
67
See Boland & Butler, supra note 51, at 5 (2009) (discussing state’s actions in amending
its rights to victims); State Victim Rights Amendments, NVCAP (2012), available at
http://www.nvcap.org/states/stvras.html, archived at http://perma.cc/93LF-8N3Q
(displaying states with victim’s rights amendments).
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to lack of enforcement.68
Perhaps in response to this growing
recognition, the federal Crime Victims’ Rights Act (“CVRA”) was
enacted in 2004.69 It guaranteed victims certain expressed rights in
federal criminal proceedings, the most important of which may have
been “standing” to directly enforce their rights at both the trial and
appellate levels.70 Several states followed suit, a few granting victim
standing through constitutional amendments—Oregon in 2008,
California in 2008, and New Jersey in 2012.71 Constitutional “standing
provisions,” while they did not give victims status as a “party,” were
intended to allow crime victims to be “participants in the process,”
rather than merely to “[have] a ‘voice’ . . . in the criminal proceedings.”72
B. Victims’ Rights in Illinois: Article I, Section 8.1 of the Illinois Constitution
and the Rights of Crime Victims and Witnesses Act
In 1993, as indicated earlier, the Illinois Constitution was amended to
include a fairly comprehensive list of victims’ rights.73 This was

68
See, e.g., Giannini, supra note 6, at 1167 (“The strength of many states' victims' rights
laws are immediately hampered by the absence of any direct method to remedy victims'
rights violations, coupled with a lack of mandatory language to enforce those rights.”).
69
See 18 U.S.C. § 3771 (2012) (enacting the Crime Victim’s Rights Act).
70
Boland & Butler, supra note 51, at 8. See generally Bandes, supra note 6, at 331–49 (1999)
(discussing the meaning and implication of standing for victims).
71
CA. CONST. art. I, § 28(b); OR. CONST. art. I, §§ 42–43; Crime Victims Bill of Rights, NJ
DEP’T L. & PUB. SAFETY, available at http://www.state.nj.us/lps/dcj/victimwitness/
cbor.htm (last visited Oct. 8, 2014), archived at http://perma.cc/KDK7-5M48.
72
See United States v. Hunter, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 443 at 5 (D. Utah Jan. 3, 2008);
Boland & Butler, supra note 51, at 6 (citing Amy Baron-Evans, National Federal Defender
Sentencing Resource Counsel, Crime Victims Rights Act (Oct. 12, 2008), available at
http://www.fd.org, archived at http://perma.cc/VX2G-UE2Q).
73
ILL. CONST. art. I, § 8.1(a). The Amendment provides:
Crime victims, as defined by law, shall have the following rights as
provided by law: (1) The right to be treated with fairness and respect
for their dignity and privacy throughout the criminal justice process.
(2) The right to notification of court proceedings. (3) The right to
communicate with the prosecution. (4) The right to make a statement
to the court at sentencing. (5) The right to information about the
conviction, sentence, imprisonment, and release of the accused. (6)
The right to timely disposition of the case following the arrest of the
accused. (7) The right to be reasonably protected from the accused
throughout the criminal justice process. (8) The right to be present at
the trial and all other court proceedings on the same basis as the
accused, unless the victim is to testify and the court determines that
the victim's testimony would be materially affected if the victim hears
other testimony at the trial. (9) The right to have present at all court
proceedings, subject to the rules of evidence, an advocate or other
support person of the victim’s choice. (10) The right to restitution.
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followed by an act of the legislature executing that constitutional
provision and, additionally, placing enforcement and notice duties on
prosecutors.74 This legislation, called the Rights of Crime Victims and
Witnesses Act (“RCVWA”), was intended to “implement, preserve[,] and
protect the rights guaranteed to crime victims by Article I, Section 8.1 of
the Illinois Constitution.”75 Although the Illinois General Assembly
placed responsibility for facilitating victims’ rights in county state’s
attorneys, the RCVWA failed to establish an enforcement mechanism in
the event local prosecutors failed in their statutory duties, or should the
victim wish to assert her rights independent of a prosecutor.76 Making
matters more difficult for victims, the new law expressly precluded any
cause of action for damages or attorneys’ fees against state actors for
failure to facilitate victims’ rights.77 One “bright light,” though, was the
legislative debates, which clearly expressed the intent that a separate
“lawsuit” could be filed in the event of non-enforcement of victims’
rights, apparently by implication from the rights legislatively
Nevertheless, for reasons discussed below, separate
expressed.78
lawsuits have been rare, at best, as they are impractical and inefficient.79
Id. This Amendment was adopted at the general election on November 3, 1992. Id.; see also
Dave McKinney, Constitutional Amendment on Victims’ Rights Passes Ill. Senate, CHI. SUN
TIMES (Apr. 25, 2012), available at http://www.suntimes.com/news/metro/12133303418/constitutional-amendment-guaranteeing-victims-rights-passes-ill-senate.html#.VDQq
ar5fHG4, archived at http://perma.cc/9G25-D6WB (discussing Illinois constitutional
amendment in victims’ rights).
74
725 ILL. COMP. STAT. 120/4 (2010).
75
Id. at 120/2.
76
Id. at 120/4.5(b).
77
Id. The statute reads:
This Act does not limit any rights or responsibilities otherwise enjoyed
by or imposed upon victims or witnesses of violent crime, nor does it
grant any person a cause of action for damages or attorneys fees. Any
act of omission or commission by any [person or entity] acting in good
faith in rendering crime victim’s assistance or otherwise enforcing this
Act shall not impose civil liability upon the individual or entity or his
or her supervisor or employer. Nothing in this Act shall create a basis
for vacating a conviction or a ground for appellate relief in any
criminal case. Failure of the crime victim to receive notice as required,
however, shall not deprive the court of the power to act regarding the
proceeding before it; nor shall any such failure grant the defendant the
right to seek a continuance.
Id.
78
See Transcript of Ill. Gen. Assemb., S. Trans. 33-34, 88-53, Reg. Sess. (1993), available at
http://www.ilga.gov/Senate/transcripts/Strans88/ST051793.pdf, archived at http://
perma.cc/BJ6-WXL4 [hereinafter Trans. Ill. Gen. Assemb.] (showing the senate transcript of
H.B. 1319 of the 88th Illinois General Assembly).
79
See infra notes 139–46 and accompanying text (discussing Myers v. Daley, 521 N.E.2d
98 (Ill. App. Ct. 1987).
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Consequently, recent legislative efforts were made to amend the
Illinois Constitution again, this time specifically to provide crime victims
independent standing to participate directly in criminal prosecutions.80
The constitutional amendatory bill was introduced in March of 2014, was
passed by joint resolution on April 10, 2014, and was ratified on the
November 2014 ballot.81 As this Article suggests, there were no
legitimate reasons for not ratifying the amendatory act; it will improve
respect for and the transparency of the criminal justice system.
Objections to similar, earlier amendatory bills were misguided. A
judicially implied right of victim standing and direct participation in
criminal proceedings already exists.82 Ratification of the legitimacy of
this inherent judicial power by positive law, constitutionally or
otherwise, will make such participation more common.
Finally,
evidence from other states makes clear that no difficulties—but greater
advantages—for the criminal justice system will now occur postratification.83

See, e.g., Amendment, supra note 7 (introduced, by Rep. Lou Lang) (providing crime
victims standing). The Amendment:
Proposes to amend the Bill of Rights Article of the Illinois Constitution
concerning crime victim's rights. Provides that in addition to other
rights provided in the Constitutional provision, a crime victim has the
right to: (1) be free from harassment, intimidation, and abuse; (2)
refuse to disclose information that is privileged or confidential by law;
(3) timely notification of all court proceedings; (4) be heard at any
proceeding involving a post-arraignment release decision, plea,
sentencing, post-conviction or post-adjudication release decision, and
any post-arraignment proceeding in which a right of the victim is at
issue; (5) receive a report related to the defendant's sentence when
available to the accused; and (6) have the safety of the victim and the
victim's family considered in denying or fixing the amount of bail,
determining whether to release the defendant, and setting conditions
of release after arrest and conviction. Provides that a victim, victim's
lawyer, or the prosecuting attorney may assert the victim's constitutional
rights in court. Provides that nothing in this Constitutional provision
creates any cause of action for compensation or damages against the
State, any political subdivision of the State, any officer, employee, or
agent of the State or of any of its political subdivisions, or any officer
or employee of the court. Effective upon being declared adopted.
Id. (emphasis added).
81
Id.
82
See infra Part III (discussing implied victim standing to assert and vindicate their
unenforced rights as a matter of statutory interpretation).
83
See infra Part V.A (describing the effects of denying implied standing for victims).
80
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III. IMPLYING VICTIM STANDING TO ASSERT AND VINDICATE THEIR
UNENFORCED RIGHTS IN ILLINOIS AS A MATTER OF STATUTORY
INTERPRETATION
As pointed out earlier, there were no provisions in the RCVWA
specifically allowing victims—as compared to prosecutors—standing to
enforce allegedly denied victims’ rights.84 Nevertheless, victim standing
to participate for this purpose can be implied as a matter of statutory
construction supported by precedent from this and other jurisdictions.85
The objective of statutory interpretation, of course, is to effectuate
legislative intent.86 Any interpretive effort must begin with reliance on
the statutory language, which is to be given its “plain meaning,” the
most reliable indicator of intent.87 Indeed, when statutory language is
clear and unambiguous as to its intended meaning in the context of an
attempted application, the text generally is the sole basis for
interpretation.88 Given ambiguity, however, the court may examine not
just the text, but other relevant sources for determining legislative intent
in that specific context.89 For example, when two or more reasonable
interpretations of the statute are possible, courts may examine both
intrinsic and extrinsic evidence of intent to resolve the ambiguity.90
As for intrinsic evidence, every phrase or clause in a statute must be
given its reasonable meaning in construing any other portion of that law,

84
See supra Part II.B (explaining victims’ rights in Illinois under the Illinois Constitution
and the rights of Crime Victims and Witnesses Act).
85
See generally infra Part IV (illustrating arguments for moving from a reasonable
implication of a separate injunctive remedy to effective and efficient direct remedies); Part
V (discussing the judicial balancing of interests in states without expressed victim standing
provisions).
86
Page v. Hibbard, 518 N.E.2d 69, 71 (Ill. 1987).
87
See Gaffney v. Bd. of Tr. of Orland Fire Prot. Dist., 969 N.E.2d 359, 372 (Ill. 2012)
(noting the plain and ordinary meaning of language used in a statute is the best indicator
for legislative intent); Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Washburn, 493 N.E.2d 1071, 1074 (Ill. 1986)
(stating that for a court to give effect to a statute the court must begin with the language
used).
88
People ex. rel. Ill. Dep’t of Corr. v. Hawkins, 952 N.E.2d 624, 631 (Ill. 2011).
89
Id. at 632; see also Solich v. George & Anna Portes Cancer Prevention Ctr. of Chicago,
Inc., 630 N.E.2d 820, 822 (Ill. 1994) (stating a court can look beyond the language of a
statute when ambiguous and consider the statute’s purpose).
90
See People v. Purcell, 778 N.E.2d 695, 699–700 (Ill. 2002) (stating a statute is ambiguous
if there are two or more reasonable interpretations). For an example of the effects of
intrinsic evidence like looking at the statute as a “whole,” see People ex rel. Republican–
Reporter Corp. v. Holmes, 239 N.E.2d 682, 685 (Ill. App. Ct. 1968), which states that when
dealing with multiple interpretations of a statute, one must look to the entire act rather
than specific sections thereof in order to determine the intent of the legislature when
creating said statute.
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and no language shall be considered superfluous.91 That is, legislation
must be read “as a whole” in that the intended meaning of a particular
clause or phrase is inherently dependent upon the language and intent of
the entire statute.92 Certainly, any reasonable construction of a law must
take into account provisions that explicitly denote its purpose.93 Thus,
although the express language of the RCVWA speaks only of the state's
attorney’s obligation to inform victims of their rights and facilitate their
exercise, this does not necessarily imply that all other actors falling within
traditional notions of “standing”—such as those “injured in fact” by
crime—are prohibited from participating in enforcing their rights if their
participation is consistent with statutory intent.94
For example, one of the stated purposes of the RCVWA is “to
implement, preserve and protect the rights guaranteed to crime victims by
Article I, Section 8.1 of the Illinois Constitution.”95 With regard to this
expressed “purpose,” the legislative intent can be ascertained as a matter
of “plain meaning.” Courts often determine “plain meaning” by
consulting a dictionary.96 Merriam Webster's Dictionary, for instance,
defines “implement” as “carry out, accomplish [or] to give practical effect
to and ensure of actual fulfillment by concrete measures.”97 Among all
these synonymous definitions of “implement,” a court is required to
choose the most comprehensive and dynamic understanding of this
word.98 To choose a less broad definition, one that would undermine the
See Sylvester v. Indus. Comm’n, 756 N.E.2d 822, 827 (Ill. 2001) (“[E]ach word, clause
and sentence [of the statute], if possible, must be given reasonable meaning and not
rendered superfluous[.]”).
92
Blum v. Koster, 919 N.E.2d 333, 338 (Ill. 2009). For example, the Act added
enforcement rights to the original constitutionally enumerated protections, including
requirements that the State inform the victim of her right, inter alia, “to retain an attorney, at
the victim's own expense, who, upon written notice filed with the clerk of the court and
State's Attorney, is to receive copies of all notices, motions and court orders filed thereafter in the
case, in the same manner as if the victim were a named party in the case[.]” 725 ILL. COMP. STAT.
120/4(b)(9) (2010) (emphasis added). It would not be unreasonable to argue, reading the
Act as a whole, that such a right expresses the intent that should the “attorney” discover
that something in the prosecution regarding his client’s rights was amiss, direct action on
her part during proceedings should be allowed.
93
725 ILL. COMP. STAT. 120/2. (delineating the purpose of the RCVWA).
94
See id. at 120/4.5(a)–(b) (discussing the State’s obligations).
95
Id. at 120/2 (emphasis added).
96
See Gaffney, 969 N.E.2d at 372–73 (referencing Merriam Webster’s Dictionary); Kaider
v. Hamos, 975 N.E.2d 667, 673 (Ill. App. Ct. 2012) (referencing Merriam Webster’s
Dictionary).
97
Implement
Definition,
MERRIAM-WEBSTER
DICTIONARY,
available
at
http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/implement (last visited Oct. 7, 2014),
archived at http://perma.cc/RHA5-FTRN.
98
See Mulligan v. Joliet Reg’l Port Dist., 527 N.E.2d 1264, 1269 (Ill. 1988) (stating that
“[s]tatutes must be construed in the most beneficial way which their language will permit
91
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effectuation of constitutional rights, would contradict the intent of the
legislature.99
Thus, any interpretation of the RCVWA that would conclude that
prosecutorial nonfeasance causing a denial of statutory rights should
result in not allowing the victim to intercede for remedial purposes
would be irrational.100 Courts are not bound by the plain or literal
meaning of statutory language if the consequences would be absurd, that
is, if the plain meaning would produce a result inconsistent with clearly
expressed legislative intent, or where an interpretation would yield
unjust consequences not contemplated by the legislature.101 Failing to
so as to prevent hardship or injustice, and to oppose prejudice to public interests”). See,
e.g., In re Det. of Lieberman, 776 N.E.2d 218, 224 (Ill. 2002) (quoting Mulligan, 527 N.E.2d at
1269); People v. Botruff, 817 N.E.2d 463, 468 (Ill. 2004) (quoting Mulligan, 527 N.E.2d at
1269).
99
See 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. 120/2 (providing that one purpose of the Rights of Crime
Victims and Witnesses Act is to increase the criminal justice system).
100
Id.
101
See In re D.F., 802 N.E.2d 800, 805 (Ill. 2003) (noting a court does not have to follow a
literal interpretation of a statute that produces unjust consequences). The court in In re D.F.
stated:
A plain language or literal reading of section 1(D)(m) supports
respondent's position that the nine-month evaluation period applies
only to a parent's reasonable progress and not a parent's reasonable
efforts. A court, however, is not bound by the literal language of a
statute that produces a result inconsistent with clearly expressed
legislative intent, or that yields absurd or unjust consequences not
contemplated by the legislature. A literal reading of section 1(D)(m)
yields a result inconsistent with the legislature's statements of public
policy and purpose contained in both the Juvenile Court Act and the
Adoption Act.
Id. (citations omitted) (emphasis added); see also People v. Hanna, 800 N.E.2d 1201, 1207–08
(Ill. 2003) (stating statutes should be construed to avoid absurdity and listing cases
supporting the court’s ability to avoid construing a statute in a manner that would lead to
an absurd result); In re Det. of Lieberman, 776 N.E.2d at 224, 226 (repeating that statutes
should not be construed in a manner which produces injustice and expressing that courts
are not bound to the literal language of a statute when it would defeat the intent of the
legislature); Collins v. Bd. of Tr. of Firemen’s Annuity & Ben. Fund of Chicago, 610 N.E.2d
1250, 1254 (Ill. 1993) (“[C]ourts are not bound by the literal language of a particular clause
that might defeat such clearly expressed intent.”) (citing Cont’l Ill. Nat’l Bank & Trust Co.
v. Ill. State Toll Highway Comm'n, 251 N.E.2d 253, 259 (Ill. 1969)). In Collins the court
indicated that:
Therefore, when the spirit and intent of the legislature are clearly
expressed and the objects and purposes of a statute are clearly set
forth, the courts are not bound by the literal language of a particular
clause that might defeat such clearly expressed intent. Ambiguity
caused by a literal and confined construction may be modified,
changed or rejected to conform to an otherwise clear legislative intent
and the judiciary has the authority to read language into a statute that
the legislature omitted through oversight. Existing circumstances at
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allow standing for victims to rectify denial of their constitutional rights
in the absence of any other convenient remedy would create an absurd
or at least an irrational result.
Another expressed purpose of the RCVWA is “to ensure that crime
victims are treated with fairness and respect for their dignity and privacy
throughout the criminal justice system.”102 The reasonable implication
from this language would be that the legislature has delegated to the
judiciary the discretionary power to do whatever would be “fair” in a
“flexible” and “broad” manner.103 There are, of course, contexts in which
a “flexible” and “broad” interpretation of amorphous language would be
unwarranted. In NAB Bank v. LaSalle, for example, the use of the term
“justice” in a statute was held not to provide the court with
“untrammeled judicial discretion” in interpretation.104 That statute
concerned foreclosure sales, an aspect of property law with a centuriesold tradition of established equitable principles.105 In NAB Bank, the
court assumed that the legislature meant for the word “justice” in
foreclosure matters to refer to this long tradition, as opposed to having
the judiciary redefine notions of “justice” already developed over the
course of the common law.106 There is, on the other hand, no similar
tradition of application of terms like “fairness,” “respect,” or “dignity” in
the context of victim's rights legislation.107 Thus, there is no preexisting
meaning or tradition of “fairness” to which courts must defer in deciding

the time the statute was enacted, contemporaneous conditions, and the
object sought to be achieved all may be considered.
Id. (citations omitted); see also People v. Hudson, 263 N.E.2d 473, 476 (Ill. 1970) (explaining
that the rules of statutory construction must yield when intent of legislature is otherwise
indicated); People v. Pohl, 969 N.E.2d 508, 513 (Ill. App. Ct. 2012) (“We may also consider
the consequences that would result from construing the statute one way or the other, and,
in doing so, we must presume that the legislature did not intend absurd, inconvenient, or
unjust consequences.”); Grams v. Autozone, Inc., 745 N.E.2d 687, 690 (Ill. App. Ct. 2001)
(noting the court may consider the reasons for a law when determining legislative intent).
102
725 ILL. COMP. STAT. 120/2 (2010) (emphasis added).
103
See Mulligan, 527 N.E.2d at 1269 (“Statutes must be construed in the most beneficial
way which their language will permit so as to prevent hardship or injustice, and to oppose
prejudice to public interests.”); see also Lake Cnty. Bd. of Review v. Prop. Tax Appeal Bd.,
519 N.E.2d 459, 461 (Ill. 1988) (stating that terms must be given their ordinary meaning and
interpreted to give the terms its full meaning); Ill. Nat’l Bank v. Chegin, 220 N.E.2d 226, 228
(Ill. 1966) (noting that courts have frequently held that absurd interpretations should be
avoided).
104
984 N.E.2d 154, 160 (Ill. App. Ct. 2013) (citing Aurora Loan Servs., Inc. v. Craddieth,
442 F.3d 1018, 1028 (7th Cir. 2006)).
105
Id.
106
Id.
107
In the Interest of K.P., 709 A.2d 315, 321–22 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1997) (discussing
the application and definitions of fairness, respect, and dignity).
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whether to imply and allow victim standing to enforce their
constitutional rights.
This was the fundamental insight of the New Jersey Supreme Court
in In the Interest of K.P. in interpreting the language of their state
constitution.108 As in the Illinois Constitution, New Jersey specifically
required “fairness” for victims.109 The court reasoned that the legislature
intended for this word to be given some judicially ascertainable
substance because there was no preexisting legal context that might
provide interpretive content to the statutory “fairness” language.110 As a
result, the court held that the legislature had impliedly delegated power
to the court to “creatively” effectuate the command of “fairness” in this
new context—enforcing victims’ rights laws—by implying victim
standing to vindicate their own rights.111 Illinois courts have an equally
sound basis for construing the terms “fairness,” “dignity,” and “respect”
under Illinois law to imply victim standing for the same purpose.
It is also important to note that the Act does not expressly or by
implication prohibit victims’ standing to request injunctive relief when
their rights have been denied for reasons beyond their control.112 It only
prohibits to “any person a cause of action for damages or attorneys fees”
for non- or misfeasance by public officials.113 Therefore, standing to seek
enforcement of denied statutory rights through injunction is not
impermissible.114 The expressed statutory prohibition applied only to
legal claims; seeking standing to participate or “intervene” in an existing
See id. at 323 (interpreting N.J. CONST. art I, pt. 22).
Id. at 321.
110
Id. at 322.
111
Id. at 323.
112
725 ILL. COMP. STAT. 120/9 (2010). The statute reads:
This Act does not limit any rights or responsibilities otherwise enjoyed
by or imposed upon victims or witnesses of violent crime, nor does it
grant any person a cause of action for damages or attorneys fees. Any act
of omission or commission by any [person or entity] acting in good
faith in rendering crime victim's assistance or otherwise enforcing this
Act shall not impose civil liability upon the individual or entity or his or
her supervisor or employer. Nothing in this Act shall create a basis for
vacating a conviction or a ground for appellate relief in any criminal
case. Failure of the crime victim to receive notice as required,
however, shall not deprive the court of the power to act regarding the
proceeding before it; nor shall any such failure grant the defendant the
right to seek a continuance.
Id. (emphasis added).
113
Id.
114
RUBEN E. AGPALO, STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION 227 (5th ed. 2003). This flows from the
interpretive maxim “expressio unius est exclusio alterius[,]” “[w]here a [clause or provision] is
expressly limited to certain matters, it may not, by interpretation or construction, be
extended to [other matters].” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
108
109
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criminal action to pursue judicial orders to enforce victims’ constitutional
rights as a matter of equity is a different matter.115 Indeed, Section 9 of
the Act might easily be read to have intentionally excluded equitable
remedies so as to preserve those remedies for criminal victims in the
event of official non- or misfeasance.116
As for extrinsic evidence, the legislative debates on the RCVWA
indicate an intent that victims who are denied their rights should be able
to bring “a lawsuit” to enforce those rights.117 This “right to remedy”

115
See generally John F. Preis, In Defense of Implied Injunctive Relief in Constitutional Cases,
22 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 1, 1 (2013) (“If Congress has neither authorized nor prohibited a
suit to enforce the Constitution, may the federal courts create one nonetheless? At present,
the answer mostly turns on the form of relief sought: if the plaintiff seeks damages, the
Supreme Court will normally refuse relief unless Congress has specifically authorized it; in
contrast, if the plaintiff seeks an injunction, the Court will refuse relief only if Congress has
specifically barred it. . . . [I]mplied injunctive relief does not contravene separation of
powers principles because Congress and the federal courts have, since the Founding,
viewed implied injunctive relief as permissible and even appropriate.” (emphasis added)).
116
See The Comm’n on Audit of the Province of CEBU v. Province of CEBU, G.R. No.
141386 (S.C., Nov. 29, 2001), available at http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2001/
nov2001/141386.htm, archived at http://perma.cc/D896-JKZQ (referencing that in
accordance with the interpretive maxim “casus omissus pro omisso habendus est.[,] [a] person,
object or thing omitted from an enumeration in a statute must be held to have been omitted
intentionally”).
117
See Trans. Ill. gen. Assemb., supra note 78, at 33–39 (discussing H.B. 1319). During the
Senate’s discussion of the Rights of Crime Victims and Witnesses Act, Senator Klemm
stated:
It appears on the analysis, Senator, that the bill gives the victims of
violent crime apparently twenty-four rights, but I see there appears to
be no enforcement mechanism. And I was concerned about if a right
was violated, then, of a victim, which we all support their rights, and
there is no way for the victim, then , to gain redress—if, in fact, there’s
no penalty, I’m wondering, what does the victim gain? And it seems
that they’re no better off than they were without the constitutional
amendment if there’s no penalty for not giving them their just due.
Id. at 33 (quoting statement from Senator Klemm). In response Senator Cullerton replied:
No, I disagree with you, Senator. This bill directs, for the most part,
judges and the State’s attorney as to what the procedures are with
regard to victims in the criminal justice process. Now I certainly am
not going to put a criminal penalty in here for, you know, the State’s
attorneys or for the judges. This is a constitutional right. This bill
codifies that constitutional right. And of course, [if] there was some
State’s attorney around the State of Illinois that chose to intentionally
violate the clear provisions of this Statute, ultimately someone would
have to bring a lawsuit, but the fact that it’s a constitutional
amendment, and the fact that it’s clearly stated in the law, does
provide the enforcement provisions that are necessary to ensure the
rights of these victims.
Id. at 33–34 (quoting statement from Senator Cullerton). Senator Klemm furthered his
position by stating:
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was apparently understood by the Illinois legislature to be implied from
the existence of the original rights granted by the Constitution and the
Act.118 Regardless of the fact that the law disallows any claim for
Well, it seems to me, Senator, that the existing law already has that.
And if—if a victim were denied any restitution, I mean, what recourse
would they have? And as you know, I think, there’s no right for suit
now, and I don’t think that when you said you could sue them, that
that would be allowed, and I don’t agree with that. Maybe you could
clarify that for us.
Id. at 34 (quoting statement from Senator Klemm). Senator Cullerton agreed with some of
Senator Klemm’s statement by saying:
Well, you’re right. Because there’s a constitutional amendment that’s
on the books, the way that someone can enforce it is to file a lawsuit
citing the Constitution. That—that much I—I agree with you on.
However, this bill gives specifics to that constitutional
amendment. . . . So, the fact is, the bill flushes out the constitutional
amendment. It makes it clear to the State’s attorney, the judges and
the victim what their rights are. If there’s a question about them not
being enforced, ultimately it would come down to a lawsuit, but
hopefully, because we will pass this bill, that lawsuit will be
unnecessary.
Id. at 34–35 (quoting statement from Senator Cullerton). Senator Butler joined the
discussion stating, “I can’t detect an enforcement procedure in here. It’s voluntary; do you
agree?” Id. at 36 (quoting statement from Senator Butler). Senator Cullerton responded:
Now you asked about enforcement. If the State’s attorneys want to
violate this Statute, or the judges want to violate this Statute, my
suggestion is, rather than put a criminal penalty in, or a fine—you’re
not going to fine the judge or the State’s attorney—you put in the
clearest status of the law and what the law is intended to mean. And if
someone feels that their rights are being violated, they have to file a
lawsuit. That’s really the only practical way, in order to implement the
provisions of the Statute.
Trans. Ill. Gen. Assemb., supra note 78, at 36–37 (quoting statement from Senator Cullerton)
(emphasis added). Senator Cullerton went on to state:
But I think that the provisions are clear, that the State’s attorneys and
the judges in this State will follow the law, and if there has to be—if
there’s one that does not want to, a lawsuit can be provided—be brought
forward to ensure the rights of the victims. . . . Senator Butler, the
amendment talks about not being able to impose civil liability upon
the—the individual—that is, the State’s attorney—for failure to
provide—to follow one of the provisions of this Act. But that doesn’t
mean that the victim can’t bring a lawsuit to enforce the provisions of the Act.
And that’s what this bill is all about.”
Id. at 37–39 (quoting statement from Senator Cullerton) (emphasis added).
118
Id. at 33–35. While responding to questions about how the RCVWA would be
“enforced” if the rights granted to victims were denied, Senator John Cullerton explained
that “the fact that it’s a constitutional amendment, and the fact that it’s clearly stated in the
law, does provide the enforcement provisions that are necessary to ensure the rights of
these victims.” Id. at 34. “If there’s a question about them not being enforced, ultimately it
would come down to a lawsuit . . . .” Id. at 34–35; see also In re Scarlett Z.-D., 11 N.E.3d 360,
387 (Ill. App. Ct. 2014) (discussing the roots of Ill. Const. of 1970, art. I, § 12 in Marbury v.
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damages for lack of prosecutorial enforcement, the debates make clear
that victims should have standing to vindicate rights through a
“lawsuit,” which suggests an implication of an intended “right to
remedy,” even if through corollary proceedings such as requests for
injunctive relief.
Finally, as for a “right to remedy,” legislative intent regarding
enforcement of victims’ rights must be understood in a manner
consistent with other constitutional provisions that speak to a citizen’s
right to a remedy for denied vested rights. All other provisions on the
same topic—remedying denied rights—should be read in pari materia
One such provision, the
with the victims’ rights provisions.119
contemporary Illinois constitutional “remedies clause,” might provide
some guidance.120 The clause can be said to originate from and reflect
the promises extracted from King John, as reflected within the Magna
Carta: “To no one will we sell, to no one will we refuse or delay, right or
justice.”121 Centuries later, Blackstone famously reflected that: “it is a
[settled] and invariable principle in the laws of England, that every right
when withheld mu[s]t have a remedy, and every injury [its] proper
redre[s]s.”122
Although the federal Bill of Rights did not acknowledge this
principle or reflect such a right, early in the history of the republic the
U.S. Supreme Court—apparently without feeling obliged to cite
precedent due to it being considered a self-evident truth by that time—
recognized the vital link between a right and a remedy:

Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 163 (1803). “Every person shall find a certain remedy in the laws for
all injuries and wrongs which he receives to his person, privacy, property, or reputation.
He shall obtain justice by law, freely, completely, and promptly.” Id. at n.9 (quoting ILL.
CONST. of 1970, art. I, § 12).
119
34 ILL. LAW AND PRAC. STATUTES § 72 (2001). Statutes in pari materia (laws relating to
the same subject matter) must be interpreted in light of each other since they have a
common purpose for comparable events or items. Id. As Lord Mansfield wrote in Rex v.
Loxdale, “[w]here there are different statutes in pari materia, though made at different times,
or even expired and not referring to each other, they shall be taken and construed together,
as one system and as explanatory of each other.” VINCENT CRABBE, UNDERSTANDING
STATUTES 75 (1994) (quoting Rex v. Loxdale, 1 Burr. 445, 447 (1758)).
120
ILL. CONST. art. I, § 12 (“Every person shall find a certain remedy in the laws for all
injuries and wrongs which he receives to his person, privacy, property or reputation. He
shall obtain justice by law, freely, completely, and promptly.”).
121
Schuman, supra note 26, at 1199 (quoting WILLIAM MCKECHNIE, MAGNA CARTA: A
COMMENTARY ON THE GREAT CHARTER OF KING JOHN 395 (2d ed. 1914) and SAMUEL E.
THORNE ET AL., THE GREAT CHARTER 132 (1965)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
122
WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, 3 COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND: IN FOUR BOOKS
109 (1800), available at https://archive.org/stream/lawsofengland03blaciala#page/
n133/mode/2up, archived at http://perma.cc/8CLH-DLXT.
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The very essence of civil liberty certainly consists in the
right of every individual to claim the protection of the
laws, whenever he receives an injury. . . . The
government of the United States has been emphatically
termed a government of laws, and not of men. It will
certainly cease to deserve this high appellation, if the
laws furnish no remedy for the violation of a vested
legal right.123
“Remedy amendments” were present in several early state
constitutions which preceded the federal constitution.124 They continue
to exist in many modern state constitutions, including that of Illinois.125
These provisions reflected the American experience, which differed from
that in England, in that the evil to eradicate was not so much corrupt
courts as it was wayward legislatures, bodies that might attempt to
eliminate—or not provide—remedies for vested claims of right.126
Remedy provisions, of course, result from different state histories and
framers’ intent and thus individual state interpretations will tend to
differ.127 In Illinois, for example, the legislature is free to revoke or
repeal a remedy for a cause of action not allowed at common law at the
time of the enactment of the constitutional “remedy provision,” but that
would not apply to claims already “vested” under current law.128
The Illinois Supreme Court, in other words, has limited the “right to
remedy” to “vested rights,” with the enforcement mechanism being the
due process clause of the Illinois Constitution.129 While there has been
Marbury, 5 U.S. at 163; see BERNARD SCHWARTZ, THE BILL OF RIGHTS: A DOCUMENTARY
HISTORY 967–68 (1971) (providing no right to a remedy).
124
Schuman, supra note 26, at 1200 (indicating several state constitutions provided
remedy amendments before the federal constitution).
125
ILL. CONST. art. I, § 12; see Schuman, supra note 26, at 1201 (listing state statutes that
provide citizens a constitutional “right to a remedy”).
126
See Schuman, supra note 26, at 1201 (stating that many American courts were
concerned with “renegade legislatures that had for example deprived injured creditors of
their judicial remedies against debtors by passing legislation impairing existing contractual
obligations”).
127
See id. (suggesting states differ in interpreting remedy provisions); see also e.g., ROBERT
F. WILLIAMS, THE LAW OF AMERICAN STATE CONSTITUTIONS 9 (2009) (providing varying
interpretations of state constitutions among the states).
128
See WILLIAMS, supra note 127, at 159–60 (suggesting the Illinois Supreme Court
departed from longstanding United States Supreme Court precedent without relying on
legislative history nor intent existing at the time of a law’s enactment and showing the
Illinois Supreme Court’s reluctance to accept a law’s expansion by the United States
Supreme Court, where the expansion would conflict with well-established state law).
129
See First of America Trust Co. v. Armstead, 664 N.E.2d 36, 39 (Ill. 1996); see also ILL.
CONST. art I, § 2 (providing the Due Process and Equal Protection clause of the Illinois
constitution).
123
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some reluctance to give a precise definition of a vested right, the Court
has said that it is “an expectation that is so far perfected that it cannot be
taken away by legislation[;] . . . a complete and unconditional demand or
exemption that may be equated with a property interest.”130 This would
appear to be the case with claims for violation of provisions expressing
constitutional or statutory rights, especially where they include a duty on
the part of state prosecutors to enforce those rights.131 Once a
prosecution is begun, victims’ rights are vested—as are defendants’
rights—and if the prosecutor fails to facilitate those rights in a pending
prosecution, as required by law, the victim should have a practical and
effective remedy.132
Thus, the Illinois due process clause, when read together with the
remedies provision, guards against the denial of any remedy at all to a
plaintiff with a vested claim, which would be the case were the county
prosecutor to fail in her duty to enforce or facilitate a victim’s right.133
130
Armstead, 664 N.E.2d at 40 (highlighting the Court’s reluctance to define a vested
right) (emphasis added). It is reasonable to assume that victims’ rights provisions
enforcing constitutional provisions provide victims with “an expectation that is so far
perfected” that they can make “a complete and unconditional demand” to enjoin provision
of those rights. Id.
131
See 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. 120/4.5(b) (2010) (establishing enforcement of victims’ rights
in the Illinois Attorney General’s office).
132
See, e.g., Allen Thomas O’Rourke, Refuge from a Jurisprudence of Doubt: Hohfeldian
Analysis of Constitutional Law, 61. S.C. L. REV. 141, 142–43, 160 (2009) (applying the
Hohfeldian analysis to federal constitutional rights). Wesley Hohfeld (1879–1918) was an
American legal theorist. Id. at 144. He argued that right and duty are correlative concepts,
i.e., that one must always be matched by the other. Id. at 160. Hohfeldian analysis is now
used in discussing constitutional issues. Id. at 143. This analysis provides another view of
rights and when they vest. For example, the Supreme Court in Blessing v. Freedstone, 520
U.S. 329, 340 (1997) impliedly using Hohfeld’s concept of a “right,” held that to enforce a
federal statute under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, “a plaintiff must assert the violation of a federal
right, not merely a violation of federal law.” Id. at 340 (citing Golden State Transit Corp. v.
Los Angeles, 493 U.S. 103, 106 (1989). The Court then identified three factors to determine
whether a particular statutory provision creates a right:
First, [a legislature] must have intended that the provision in question
benefit the plaintiff. . . . Second, the plaintiff must demonstrate that
the right assertedly protected by the statute is not so ‘vague and
amorphous’
that
its
enforcement
would
strain
judicial
competence. . . . Third, the statute must unambiguously impose a
binding obligation on the States.
Id. at 340–41 (citation omitted).
133
Otherwise, a prosecutor could negate the legislative policy reflected in Section 8.1 of
the Illinois Constitution and its enabling statute. In other words, withholding of an
enforcement remedy for failing to provide statutory victims' rights would be treating such
a deprivation as a non-injury, negating the positive law creating those rights. Schuman,
supra note 26, at 1207–08. “A person acquires a vested right to a remedy for a cause of
action when that cause of action ‘accrues.’” Id. at 1207. To determine when the cause of
action accrues, one must look to the applicable local law and if at the time the cause of
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Further, although the crime victims’ law makes no such distinction as to
types of crime, an even stronger case for implied direct enforcement by
domestic violence victims flows from the existence of the Illinois
Domestic Violence Act of 1986, where the legislature had earlier—and
now has twice—affirmed its intent to provide victims of that crime with
remedies.134 In any event, assuming that a right to remedy may be
implied, and that separate equitable if not legal actions reasonably can be
implied as that remedy, victims' standing to directly participate in criminal
proceedings for vindication of her rights would seem to reasonably
follow.
IV. VICTIM STANDING TO PARTICIPATE IN CRIMINAL PROSECUTIONS TO SEEK
RELIEF FOR DENIED RIGHTS: FROM A REASONABLE IMPLICATION OF A
SEPARATE INJUNCTIVE REMEDY TO EFFECTIVE AND EFFICIENT DIRECT
REMEDIES
The 1993 legislative debates on the Victims’ Rights Act indicate that,
should a prosecutor fail to facilitate or enforce victims’ rights, “a
lawsuit” could be filed to seek relief.135 Actually, this understanding—
apparently shared by the General Assembly—of an implied right to
remedy for victims in Illinois preceded those debates. Although not
permitted under current law, in 1987 an Illinois court implied a separate
suit for damages for denial of victims’ rights.136 In Myers v. Daley, a victim
of a crime attempted to obtain information from the state’s attorney as to
whether the state was going to prosecute his case.137 After several
inquiries were ignored, the victim sued to enforce his rights under an
earlier version of the Illinois Bill of Rights for Victims and Witnesses of
Violent Crime Act.138 In response, the state’s attorney informed the

action accrued, there was a viable remedy, no subsequent laws may take away that
remedy. Id. at 1208.
134
750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 60/101-401 (2010); see 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. 120/1-9 (supplying
legislative intent); 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 60/102 (2), (6) (declaring that among the
“purposes” of the law are to “facilitate accessibility of remedies under the Act to provide
immediate and effective assistance and protection [to domestic violence victims],” and to
“[e]xpand the civil and criminal remedies for victims of domestic violence . . . .”); see also
Rebecca Goddard, Note, When It’s the First Time Every Time: Eliminating the “Clean Slate” of
Pretrial Diversions in Domestic Violence Crimes, 49 VAL. U. L. REV. 267, 302–04 (2014)
(discussing the importance of appropriate remedies to victims of domestic violence).
135
See infra note 158 (providing example state legislation based on pertinent sections of
the Act).
136
Myers v. Daley, 521 N.E.2d 98, 100 (Ill. App. Ct. 1987).
137
See id. at 99 (showing victims requested information on multiple occasions).
138
See id. (invoking the Act in a letter to the State’s Attorney). The Illinois Bill of Rights
for Victims and Witnesses of Violent Crime Act was originally codified in chapter 38,
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victim of the status of the case and asked that he voluntarily drop his
complaint.139 The victim agreed, but only if the State would pay his
court costs of ninety-two dollars and thirty cents.140 The state’s attorney
refused, and the victim then filed a second action requesting an award of
the court costs.141 The appellate court ordered the State to pay the
victim's costs, noting that to direct otherwise would run counter to the
purpose of the Illinois victims' rights act, which required that “upon
request by the victim of a violent crime, the State’s Attorney must inform
the victim of the status of the State’s Attorney’s investigation of the
case.”142 According to the Myers court, “the purpose of the Act would be
frustrated if a victim were forced to file suit to learn the status of his case,
and were also burdened with the costs of that suit.”143 This decision,
implying a cause of action from the Act so as not to frustrate legislative
intent, presented the justification for the judicial implication of a claim
for a separate remedy for denied rights apart from the criminal
prosecution, and in addition to implied standing as a matter of statutory
construction.
A. Victims’ Standing to Sue Separately for Equitable Relief: The Analogy of
Implying Causes of Action in Civil Practice
Since suits for damages against public officials for victims’ rights
violations are now expressly precluded, however, another remaining
option would be a separate cause of action for equitable relief.144 Yet,
notwithstanding some discussion in the legislative debates suggesting
paragraph 1401 et seq. of the Illinois Revised Statutes (1985). See 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. 120
(2010) (providing the current language).
139
725 ILL. COMP. STAT. 120.
140
See Myers, 521 N.E.2d at 99–100 (dismissing complaint and awarding court costs).
141
See id. at 100 (detailing the State’s Attorney’s appeal of the order assessing court costs
following the dismissal of the complaint).
142
Id.; see 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. 120/4 (providing the language of the Act).
143
Myers, 521 N.E.2d at 100.
144
See supra notes 76–78, 112–16 (precluding the collection of damages and discussing the
distinction between prohibition of legal and equitable remedies). It should be noted,
however, that while statutorily prohibited in Illinois, damages suits under these
circumstances exist in other jurisdictions. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 13-4437.B (2000)
(demonstrating Arizona's victims' rights statute, for example, includes a provision which
reads that “[a] victim has the right to recover damages from a governmental entity
responsible for the intentional, knowing or grossly negligent violation of the victim's rights
under the victims' bill of rights”). ARIZ. CONST. art. II, § 2.1. In Arizona, a “victim [also]
has standing to seek an order, [or] to bring a special action [mandating that the victim be
afforded] any right or to challenge an order denying any right guaranteed to victims under
the victims' bill of rights, . . . any implementing legislation or court rules.” ARIZ. REV. STAT.
§ 13-4437(A)–(B) (2000). Utah law also provides that victims may bring a variety of special
actions, although not for damages, to enforce their rights. UTAH CODE § 77-38-11 (2010).
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that a “lawsuit” could be filed, there is, of course, no expressed statutory
right to file for injunctive relief. However, as in Myers, an Illinois court
may imply an individual cause of action from a statute if:
(1) plaintiff is a member of the class for whose benefit
the Act was enacted; (2) it is consistent with the
underlying purpose of the Act; (3) plaintiff’s injury is
one that the Act was designed to prevent; and (4) it is
necessary to provide an adequate remedy for violations
of the Act.145
Unlike federal courts, Illinois courts do not require potential
plaintiffs to show that the legislature intended to create a private cause of
action, only that the legislature did not expressly indicate any intent to
limit the remedies available to those provided under the Act.146
Consequently, in addition to the supportive comments in the legislative
history, and although claims for damages are precluded, an implied
equitable cause of action would be justified.147
There are four reasons Illinois courts could have found that victims
have standing to join a criminal case via an equitable cause of action.
First, crime victims, by definition, are within the class the victims’ rights
provisions were intended to benefit.148 Second, an equitable cause of
action is consistent with the statute’s underlying purpose because the
rights granted to victims are for their protection.149 Third, the statute is
145
See Corgan v. Muehling, 574 N.E.2d 602, 609 (Ill. 1991) (holding that the Psychologist
Registration Act implied a cause of action for a patient injured by an unregistered
psychologist). Also, a separate cause of action may be implied where the statute would be
practically ineffective without such an implication. See also Fisher v. Lexington Health
Care, Inc., 722 N.E.2d 1115, 1119–20 (Ill. 1999) (establishing alternative means for implying
a private right of action).
146
See Sawyer Realty Group, Inc. v. Jarvis Corp., 432 N.E.2d 849, 852 (Ill. 1982)
(recognizing a private right of action in the absence of an express remedy and limiting
private rights of action only where the legislature expressly precludes it). To imply a
private cause of action from a federal statute, a plaintiff must show that a specific
legislative intent to create a private cause of action exists under the statute. See, e.g.,
Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 284 (2001) (holding that there is no private cause of
action to enforce Title VI disparate-impact regulations due to a lack of legislative intent).
147
UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-38-11(1) (specifying Utah law allows for a separate equitable
suit). “If a person acting under color of state law willfully or wantonly fails to perform
duties so that the rights [of crime victims] are not provided, an action for injunctive relief,
including prospective injunctive relief, may be brought against the individual and the
governmental entity that employs the individual.” Id.
148
See 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. 120/3(a) (2010) (defining a crime victim subject to the Act).
149
See ILL. CONST. art. I, § 8.1 (outlining rights guaranteed to crime victims); see also 725
ILL. COMP. STAT. 120/2 (establishing the purpose of the Act is to protect a victim’s rights
under ILL. CONST. art. I, § 8.1).
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intended to prevent prosecutorial non- or misfeasance that causes crime
victims further injury by losing their express rights.150 Finally, rather
than a private cause of action, direct victim intervention is necessary
because, otherwise, victims will have no other means to enforce their
rights.151 No one has brought a separate lawsuit in Illinois, even though
there is a growing sense that victims’ rights have often been, and
continue to be, ignored.152 Perhaps this curious lack of separate litigation
results from the reasonable assumption that although the legislature
intended to enforce express rights, they intended effective and efficient
enforcement of those rights, and a separate lawsuit is neither effective
nor efficient.153
B. The Argument for Direct Victims’ Participation in Criminal Proceedings
to Enforce Denied Rights in Lieu of Separate Equitable Actions
“Statutes must be construed in the most beneficial way which their
language will permit so as to prevent hardship or injustice, and to oppose
prejudice to public interests.”154 A separate lawsuit would be just such a
150
Although the Illinois General Assembly limited the remedies available under the
RCVWA by expressly denying “cause[s] of action for damages or attorneys fees,” the
General Assembly did not indicate intent to exclude equitable relief. 725 ILL. COMP. STAT.
120/9. To the contrary, the sponsor of the Act, State Senator John Cullerton, stated that a
victim could bring “a lawsuit” to vindicate her rights. See Trans. Ill. Gen. Assemb., supra
note 78, at 34 (providing statements of State Sen. Cullerton).
151
See Trans. Ill. Gen. Assemb., supra note 78, at 34 (articulating the necessity for a private
right of action).
152
See DAVIS ET AL., supra note 4, at 12–13 (“Despite . . . remarkable progress in the
passage of crime victims’ rights, advocates have been dismayed to see that, too often,
victims’ rights were violated with impunity. An NIJ-funded survey of crime victims in
1998 found that, even within states with strong victims’ rights legislation, many victims
were not notified about key hearings and proceedings, many were not given the
opportunity to be heard, and few received restitution. Although victims in these states
generally fared better than those in states with weak victims’ rights legislation, as many as
one-third of victims in strong-protection states were not afforded the opportunity to
exercise certain rights.” (citations omitted)); infra notes 345–46 and accompanying text
(stating that the prosecutor’s and victim’s goals do not always align).
153
Trans. Ill. Gen. Assemb., supra note 78, at 32. The transcript reads:
Last year, as we’re well aware, the Crime Victims’ Rights
Constitutional Amendment passed with the approval of our citizens in
the State of Illinois, and this bill is an attempt to codify, by enacting
legislation, that constitutional amendment, so as to enforce the rights of
the crime victims of our State.
Id. at 32 (statement of State Sen. Cullerton) (emphasis added). The plain meaning of
“enforce” is “to make active or effective.” Enforce Definition, MERRIAM-WEBSTER.COM,
available at http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/enforce (last visited Oct. 26,
2014), archived at http://perma.cc/K8D-TPP5.
154
Mulligan v. Joliet Reg’l Port Dist., 527 N.E.2d 1264, 1269 (Ill. 1988) (emphasis added);
see also Illinois Nat’l Bank v. Chegin, 220 N.E.2d 226, 228 (Ill. 1966) (stating that the law
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“hardship”—time-consuming, resource-wasting, and far from a timely
or meaningful remedy.155 Most likely, by the time equitable relief could
be granted in a separate suit the original criminal prosecution will be
concluded. The victim would no longer have rights to enforce, which
contradicts the statutory purpose to implement victims’ rights.156
Therefore, victims would not be provided with a meaningful remedy
through a separate “lawsuit.” Effective and efficient remedies are better
accomplished through motions or petitions filed by victims within the
criminal prosecution, demands for relief that could be heard directly and
immediately.157
This better approach—direct victim participation—is suggested by
analogy to other existing aspects of legal procedure. In civil actions, for
example, those who are initially nonparties are afforded the opportunity,
if necessary, to present claims or defenses through the statutory device of
intervention.158 Illinois’ law provides for both interventions as of right
and permissive intervention.159 If obtained, intervention allows for the
requires that a statute be given a reasonable interpretation according to the legislature’s
intent, by looking to the meaning of the statute and the reasons for its enactment). Further,
“where the language of a statute admits of two constructions, one of which would make
the enactment absurd, if not mischievous, while the other renders it reasonable and
wholesome, the construction which leads to an absurd result will be avoided.” Id.
155
See, e.g., Myers v. Daley, 521 N.E.2d 98, 100 (Ill. App. Ct. 1987) (demonstrating a
prohibitive burden is required of a victim).
156
See In re D.F., 802 N.E.2d 800, 805 (Ill. 2003) (“A court, however, is not bound by the
literal language of a statute that produces a result inconsistent with clearly expressed
legislative intent, or that yields absurd or unjust consequences not contemplated by the
legislature.”).
157
See, e.g., Myers, 521 N.E.2d at 100 (indicating that relief under the Act would be
“frustrated if victims were forced to file suit”); 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. 120/9 (2010) (“This Act
does not limit any rights or responsibilities otherwise enjoyed by or imposed upon victims or
witnesses of violent crime.” (emphasis added)); see also Kyl et al., supra note 19, at 616
(arguing the importance of a victim’s right to be heard “at the very moment when their
rights are at stake” and thus be free from unreasonable delay as to the right to intervene).
158
735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/2–408 (2010). The state’s judiciary has a substantial history of
implying causes of action from state statutes. See, e.g., Sawyer Realty Group, Inc. v. Jarvis
Corp., 432 N.E.2d 849, 852 (Ill. 1982) (stating that courts can imply a private cause of action
for violation of the statute that provides no express remedy); Kelsay v. Motorola, Inc., 384
N.E.2d 353, 357 (Ill. 1978) (implying a cause of action from the Workmen’s Compensation
Act for retaliatory discharge); Boyer v. Atchison, Topeka and Santa Fe Ry. Co., 230 N.E.2d
173, 176–77 (Ill. 1967) (implying a cause of action from the Federal Safety Appliance Act);
Witt v. Forest Hosp., 450 N.E.2d 811, 813 (Ill. App. Ct. 1983) (implying a cause of action
from the Guardianship and Advocacy Act); Sherman v. Field Clinic, 392 N.E.2d 154, 161
(Ill. App. Ct. 1979) (implying a cause of action from the Illinois Collection Agency Act);
Walinski v. Morrison & Morrison, 377 N.E.2d 242, 244 (Ill. App. Ct. 1978) (demonstrating a
cause of action from Article I, Section 17 of the Illinois Constitution in situations where
individuals are discriminated against during the employment process or in the sale or
rental of real property on the basis of race, color, creed, national ancestry, or sex).
159
735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/2-408(a) (2010). Intervention as of right is available:
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disposal of entire controversies in a single lawsuit, thus avoiding
separate re-litigation of related issues.160 Usually, intervention is allowed
when necessary to protect the rights of the proposed intervenor; once
allowed, the intervenor receives all the rights of an original party, except
as justice and the avoidance of undue delay may require.161 Under the
recently passed constitutional amendment, however, the “intervention”
or participation would be limited solely to seeking relief for denied
rights. Therefore, this aspect of civil procedure—and its function—
supports the notion of direct victim participation in criminal
prosecutions to vindicate their rights as a matter of efficiency and
judicial economy.
C. Implying Victims’ Standing in Criminal Prosecutions: The Analogy of
“Third Party” Intervention in Criminal Prosecutions
Crime victims, it would seem, also meet the traditional criteria for
personal standing and participation or “intervention” in criminal
prosecutions.162 It would, therefore, be odd to conclude that victims
(1) when a statute confers an unconditional right to intervene; or (2)
when the representation of the [intervenor’s] interest by existing
parties is or may be inadequate and the [intervenor] will or may be
bound by an order or judgment in the action; or (3) when the
[intervenor] is so situated as to be adversely affected by a distribution
or other disposition of property in the custody or subject to the control
or disposition of the court or a court officer.
Id. Permissive intervention is available “(1) when a statute confers a conditional right to
intervene; or (2) when an [intervenor’s] claim or defense and the main action have a
question of law or fact in common.” Id. at 5/2-408(b). Intervention is within the discretion
of the court. Id.
160
735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/2-408(a)–(b); see infra notes 171–72 and accompanying text
(discussing how the presiding judge can address both criminal and civil suits involving
related issues); People ex rel. Birkett v. City of Chicago, 779 N.E.2d 875, 887 (Ill. Ct. 2002)
(discussing how the practice of intervention is liberalizing and avoids re-litigation of issues
in a second suit).
161
735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/2-408(f) (2010) (emphasis added); City of Chicago v. Zik, 211
N.E.2d 545, 546 (Ill. App. Ct. 1965) (allowing an applicant to intervene after judgment
because the intervenor was unaware of the original suit until after judgment was entered).
Illinois courts, however, liberally construe the intervention statute in favor of intervenors.
See Bredberg v. City of Wheaton, 182 N.E.2d 742, 747–48 (Ill. 1962) (pointing out that
intervention is desirable to allow a person the opportunity to protect an interest which is in
jeopardy due to the pending litigation).
162
See generally Valley Forge Christian Coll. v. Ams. United for Separation of Church and
State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 474–76 (1982) (discussing with some clarity the various criteria for
individual standing). They would be making claims of direct injury in fact to the court
which, though proximately caused by prosecutorial omission, could readily be redressed
by the court; nor are they asserting a third party’s claim or “generalized grievances,” and
they clearly fall within the “zone of interests” sought to be protected by the statute. Id. But
see State v. Leingang, 763 N.W.2d 769, 774–75 (N.D. 2009) (holding that a victim cannot be
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should in any way be denied the ability to directly enforce their statutory
rights in this most effective manner. Actually, there is recent precedent
in at least one Illinois circuit court implying victim standing under these
circumstances.163 There is also persuasive dictum from at least one other
jurisdiction supporting such an implication; Connecticut, for example,
has modeled its victims’ rights statute on Illinois’.164 In a fairly recent
case construing Connecticut’s statute, State v. Gault, a victim filed an
affidavit under seal in a criminal prosecution.165 The press wanted the
redacted affidavit unsealed and the judge granted its motion.166 The
victim sought to appeal the order, arguing that the statute implied that the
victim had such a right.167 The Connecticut Supreme Court dismissed
the appeal, holding that the victim had no standing to appeal because
she was not legally a party:
The state claims . . . that the victim’s rights amendment
does not provide victims with party status. It argues
that the amendment, by its terms, delegates the
authority for its enforcement to the General Assembly,
and that body has not passed legislation providing for
party status for crime victims or otherwise conveying a
right to appeal. We agree with the state.168
However, in dicta, the court noted that the victim had never moved to
intervene in the criminal case, thus suggesting that if she had initially
sought to intervene, at least regarding her rights as a victim, she might
have been a “party” eligible to file an appeal with regard to the
unsealing of her affidavit.169
Whether or not crime victims are “parties” to a criminal prosecution,
they are certainly interested “third parties” with regard to the
enforcement of their rights.
In Illinois, the procedural tool of
intervention has been allowed in criminal proceedings if neither of the
existing parties are protecting a third party’s constitutional rights.170 For
given standing to challenge the district court’s termination of the defendant’s probation
since this did not cause injury to the victim directly or imminently).
163
People v. Johnson, 12 CF 76 (Dekalb Cnty., Ill. June 8, 2012) (granting standing and
intervention in a criminal case to a victim).
164
State v. Gault, 39 A.3d 1105, 1112 n.12 (Conn. 2012).
165
Id. at 1107.
166
Id. at 1109.
167
Id. at 1107.
168
Id. at 1110–11 (emphasis added).
169
Id. at 1110, nn.9–10.
170
See Klem v. Mann, 665 N.E.2d 514, 517 (Ill. App. Ct. 1996) (insurer sought to exercise a
subrogation lien against a child's estate and did so with reasonable diligence in seeking
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example, in People v. Kelly, the court held that a petition to intervene,
rather than a separate equitable action, was the appropriate vehicle for
media assertions of First Amendment rights to access the criminal court
proceedings.171 Public policy, the court noted, favors intervention over
corollary litigation because the judge presiding over the criminal case is
familiar with the facts and the defendant already has representation.172
Illinois courts, therefore, already favor intervention over separate
lawsuits as an appropriate vehicle to vindicate third parties as a matter
of judicial economy.173 Similarly, it would seem most efficient for crime
victims to assert and remedy the denial of their statutory rights by
moving for specific relief, as necessary, as part of the prosecution of a
criminal case.
While a few states, such as Rhode Island, have held that permissive
intervention “has no place in a criminal proceeding,” Illinois courts have
repeatedly granted permissive intervention to third parties whose rights
or interests require protection.174 News organizations, even in cases
other than Kelly, have used intervention to vindicate violations of their
constitutional right of access to judicial proceedings.175 Although, both
intervention); see also In re Interest of K.P., 709 A.2d 315, 322 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1997)
(holding that, under New Jersey’s broad constitutional victims’ rights provision, a victim
had standing and an unarticulated right to oppose a petition by the press to open a juvenile
proceeding).
171
People v. Kelly, 921 N.E.2d 333, 344, 349 (Ill. App. Ct. 2009); see People v. Pelo, 894
N.E.2d 415, 416 (Ill. App. Ct. 2008) (affirming trial court’s grant of a newspaper’s petition to
intervene for purpose of seeking its First Amendment right to access to a transcript and
other court records in a criminal case; indeed, the Illinois legislature had codified that
right); People v. LaGrone, 838 N.E.2d 142, 146 (Ill. App. Ct. 2005) (holding that media were
allowed to intervene in a criminal case for the purpose of asserting constitutional right to
access to the courts); In re Interest of K.P., 709 A.2d at 321 (finding that a victim has standing
and an unarticulated right to oppose a petition by the press under New Jersey’s broad
constitutional victims’ rights provision).
172
Kelly, 921 N.E.2d at 345–46. The judge presiding over the criminal case, being familiar
with the facts, can retain the authority, and exercise due discretion, to make appropriate
decisions regarding a victim’s rights as well. The defendant already has criminal counsel
and, from the point of view of all concerned, the matter is best kept out of civil courts. Id.
173
Pelo, 894 N.E.2d at 416.
174
State v. Cianci, 496 A.2d 139, 146 (R.I. 1985); see Douglas E. Beloof, Constitutional
Implications of Crime Victims as Participants, 88 CORNELL L. REV. 282, 285–86 (2003)
(discussing the opinion that intervention is inappropriate because it is a civil procedure
mechanism not fit for criminal trials and it violates the right of the criminal defendant to
have a fair trial because defendant’s trial should not be interrupted by adjudication of third
party interests that can later be brought as a civil matter). However, in Illinois, courts
allow third parties to intervene in criminal cases at the court's discretion, and thus this
precedent is inapposite.
175
See, e.g., Pelo, 894 N.E.2d at 416 (affirming a trial court’s grant of a newspaper’s
petition to intervene for purpose of seeking its First Amendment right to access to a
transcript and other court records in a criminal case); LaGrone, 838 N.E.2d at 143–45

Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2015

Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 49, No. 3 [2015], Art. 7

632

VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 49

the First Amendment and Section 4 of Article I of the Illinois
Constitution grant the press a right of access to court records and
criminal proceedings—and the Illinois General Assembly codified the
public’s right of access—the right to intervene in criminal prosecutions is
News organizations must still petition for
not unconditional.176
permissive intervention to assert their “right of access.”177 Thus, if the
members of the press have, as a matter of judicial discretion, properly
been granted intervention in criminal cases to vindicate their rights,
crime victims should also have standing to “intervene” to vindicate their
unprotected statutory rights.178
In conclusion, a reasonable interpretation of the Victims’ Rights Act
already implied an independent right to file a separate suit in equity to
enforce constitutional and statutory rights denied to victims in a criminal
prosecution. However, since such “lawsuits” would be inefficient and
ineffective, few if any have been filed. Nevertheless, by analogy to the
general criteria and reasons for implying a cause of action under existing
law, and to the justifications for allowing permissive intervention in
criminal and civil practice, victim standing to seek redress for denied
rights directly in criminal proceedings—even absent the recent
amendment—would appear warranted. This has been true in other
states that, like Illinois, have not expressly authorized victim standing.
Thus, passage of the “victims’ standing” constitutional amendment
simply clarified and guaranteed what already may be implied from
current law. Indeed, other states without expressed victim standing
have come to this conclusion, and have implied standing.

(finding that intervention is the appropriate method for news organizations to assert their
constitutional right to present public access issues); see also In re Interest of K.P., 709 A.2d at
321 (stating that under New Jersey’s victims’ rights provision, a victim has standing and an
unarticulated right to oppose a petition by the press to open a juvenile proceeding).
176
705 ILL. COMP. STAT. 105/16(6) (2010); Kelly, 921 N.E.2d at 344. In addition, there is a
common law presumption recognized by the Supreme Court that allows the public to
inspect and copy public records and documents, such as judicial records and documents.
Kelly, 921 N.E.2d at 344; see U.S. CONST. amend. I (the right of freedom of religion, speech,
press, assembly, and petition); ILL. CONST. art. I, § 4 (describing freedom of speech under
the Illinois State Constitution); 705 ILL. COMP. STAT. 105/16(6) (2010) (explaining how the
records of the court are maintained by the clerks and required by law to be public with all
individuals having free access to inspect and examine them).
177
See 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/2-408(b) (2010) (providing permissive intervention in the
state of Illinois); Kelly, 921 N.E.2d at 344–46 (holding that the media’s use of a petition to
intervene was the proper vehicle to seek access to sealed court proceedings and records in a
criminal trial).
178
See People v. Johnson, 12 CF at 76 (Dekalb Cnty., Ill. June 8, 2012) (granting standing
and intervention in a criminal case to a victim).
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V. IMPLYING STANDING IN STATES WITHOUT EXPRESSED VICTIM STANDING
PROVISIONS: JUDICIAL BALANCING OF INTERESTS
State courts generally hold that victims, not being “parties” to
criminal prosecutions, do not automatically have standing to challenge
denial of their statutory rights or interests.179 This is even the case where
states expressly provide for those rights in their constitution or laws.
However, where victims assert implied standing in states with no
express standing, the issue becomes the appropriate scope of the
expressed right sought to be vindicated, and the reasonableness of the
remedy sought. In other words, in practice, denial of implied victim
standing in those states occurs where there is an alleged conflict between
the extent of the right sought by the victim and what are adjudged to be
more important exercises of prosecutorial discretion, or where claims of
an implied remedy for a denial of rights are, on balance, found to
significantly interfere with a defendant’s due process rights.
A. Denying Implied Standing: Conflicts Between the Scope of the Victim’s
Right Asserted and the Superior Need to Protect Prosecutorial Discretion
Under existing victims’ rights provisions, victims ordinarily cannot
challenge prosecutorial or judicial decisions.180 This is usually true
where the relationship between the expressed right and the scope of the
remedy sought is so attenuated as to be outweighed by a significant
intrusion upon prosecutorial discretion. For example, a victim’s “right to
speak at sentencing” does not mean a victim may use the right in an effort
to alter or dictate the terms of the sentence requested by the state.181 In

179
See, e.g., Cooper v. Dist. Ct., 133 P.3d 692, 695–714 (Alaska Ct. App. 2006) (rejecting
various arguments that victim had standing to seek appellate review of sentencing error
and her right to have part of a sentencing hearing sealed); Dix v. Superior Ct., 807 P.2d
1063, 1067 (Cal. 1991) (finding that individual victims do not have standing to intervene in
ongoing criminal cases); People v. Parriera, 46 Cal. Rptr. 835, 840 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1965)
(reasoning that the victim of the crime is not a party); see also Lamb v. Kontgias, 901 A.2d
860, 864–69 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2006) (holding victim was not party to criminal
prosecution and did not have standing to appeal lack of notice and opportunity to speak at
hearing to reconsider sentence); In re State ex rel. Sistrunk, 142 S.W.3d 497, 502–03 (Tex. Ct.
App. 2004) (holding victim’s family had no standing to challenge defendant’s sentence or
procedures at sentencing hearing); Commonwealth v. Malloy, 450 A.2d 689, 693 (Pa. Super.
Ct. 1982) (finding criminal victim was not a party to criminal prosecution and did not have
standing to appeal decision dismissing complaint).
180
See, e.g., Gansz v. People, 888 P.2d 256, 257 (Colo. 1995) (holding that there is no victim
statutory right to be heard at a hearing on a district attorney’s motion to dismiss criminal
charges).
181
See, e.g., Dix, 807 P.2d at 1067 (discussing how a crime victim sought to recall and
resentence defendant for aggravated assault, the California Supreme Court reversed,
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Cooper v. District Court, a victim sought to appeal her husband’s
suspended sentence entered under a plea agreement and seal portions of
the sentencing hearing.182 She was held not to have standing to do so
under either the state constitutional amendment or the Victims’ Rights
Act; her only expressed right was to have a “timely disposition,” which
was satisfied.183 Also, victims’ demands for remedies for insufficient
notice of hearings are usually rejected if the victim seeks to reopen pleas
or sentences unless the trial court or the state has voluntarily chosen to
do so, or important interests of the victim still have not been resolved.184
An example of this latter exception is Ford v. State.185 The victim
moved to declare a plea conference and agreement null and void because
she only received four days’ notice of the hearing on the plea, alleging it
eliminated her right to speak at sentencing.186 Insufficient notice to the
victim, however, did not prevent the court from entering the plea
agreement.187 Nevertheless, the court granted the victim’s petition to
reopen the sentence limited to the question of restitution because the state
conceded that, although restitution was a victim’s right, in this case it
There had, in fact, been an inappropriate
had been denied.188
distribution of funds among victims for which there would otherwise be
no appellate remedy.189 Rights—such as restitution in a criminal
disposition—are personal to the victim, cannot be waived, and a victim
has no obligation to remain silent on this issue even if the state has
agreed to do so pursuant to a plea agreement.190 Thus, given the
cooperation of the state and the lack of interference with the defendant’s

holding that the victim had no standing in the defendant’s criminal proceeding, that the
victims’ rights statute provided a victim with no “resentencing power”).
182
Cooper, 133 P.3d at 694–95 (concluding that the constitutional right of victim of
domestic violence to a timely disposition of defendant’s case was satisfied notwithstanding
victim’s claim that trial court failed to properly sentence defendant by not requiring him to
attend a batterer’s intervention treatment program). The victim’s rights were satisfied
inasmuch as the sentencing took place in a timely manner, even if the appellate court were
later to conclude that the proceedings were flawed. Id. at 694.
183
Id. at 700–01.
184
State v. Casey, 44 P.3d 756, 757–58 (Utah 2002) (explaining how a victim filed a motion
to reject a plea bargain and the trial court informally reopened the plea hearing to accept
the victim’s testimony, that of his mother, permitted argument from the victim's counsel,
and then reaffirmed the plea that any violation of the victim’s rights was cured).
185
Ford v. State, 829 So.2d 946, 947–48 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2002).
186
Id. at 947.
187
Id.
188
Id. at 948.
189
Id.
190
State v. Robinson, No. C1–02–1957, 2003 WL 21694412, at *3 (Minn. Ct. App. 2003).
On the other hand, a victim’s failure to assert a right to restitution within a reasonable time
will constitute a waiver of that right. In re Alton D., 994 P.2d 402, 406 (Ariz. 2000).

https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol49/iss3/7

Schlam: Enforcing Victim's Rights in Illinois: The Rationale for Victim

2015]

Enforcing Victims’ Rights in Illinois

635

expectations, the court allowed the victim standing limited to recovering
losses resulting from an admittedly denied right that would otherwise
not be remedied.191
On the other hand, courts have more difficulty providing remedies
where the requested remedy interferes with prosecutorial discretion or a
defendant’s rights to a fair trial. Thus, a victim’s right to “confer with the
prosecutor”—even coupled with her broad right to “fairness” articulated
in the same statute—does not grant her the right to discover evidence in
a prosecutor’s criminal file to facilitate her civil suit.192 Nor does a
victim’s right to be present at all crucial stages of criminal proceedings
imply standing to join the prosecutor at the counsel table.193 Such
allegedly implied “rights” are too tenuously related to—or are much
broader than—the expressed rights and, perhaps more importantly,
interfere with either prosecutorial discretion or defendants’ rights.
While a victim’s presence at the counsel table may allow the victim and
the prosecution to confer—perhaps adding to the truth-finding process—
a certification by the prosecutor of this necessity rather than an assertion
of an implied victim’s right to do so is the only basis for such a
privilege.194 Thus, without express standing, it seems fair to assume
courts will most likely imply victim standing only when it is essential to
accomplish justice, or when the scope of the victim’s asserted right is
consistent with the rationale for the right.
B. Denying Implied Standing: Conflicts Between a Victim’s View of the
Scope of Her Rights and a Defendant’s Due Process Rights
Under somewhat similar facts, in State v. Harrison, the court held that
where a trial court permitted a victim's advocate to sit near the victim
while she testified and allowed a guardian ad litem to sit at the state’s
counsel table and question witnesses, such a "team prosecution" was
191
Ford, 829 So.2d at 948 n.1 (citing United States v. DiFrancesco, 449 U.S. 117, 139, 143
(1980)) (finding that “a federal statute allowing the government to appeal a sentence on the
ground that it is too lenient does not violate federal double jeopardy . . . [as] a sentence is
not accorded the same finality, under federal double jeopardy principles, as an acquittal”).
192
State ex rel. Hilbig v. McDonald, 839 S.W.2d 854, 856 (Tex. Ct. App. 1992) (deciding
that in promulgating the constitutional amendment and statute on crime victims’ rights,
the legislature did not intend for crime victims to have a right to discover material within
the prosecutor’s file in a pending criminal matter).
193
See State v. Harrison, 24 P.3d 936, 945–47 (Utah 2001) (concluding that allowing a
“team prosecution” was plain error and inherently prejudicial by allowing the guardian ad
litem to sit at the counsel table and question witnesses during trial).
194
See Crowe v. State, 485 So. 2d 351, 362–63 (Ala. Crim. App. 1984) (holding that victims
may sit at the counsel table upon a showing by the prosecutor that the victim will be of
material assistance); Hall v. State, 579 So. 2d 329, 330 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1991) (determining
that victims may sit at the counsel table to assist the prosecution).
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plain error and inherently prejudicial to the defendant.195 In other
prosecutions as well, judicial failures to imply standing where it would
unreasonably expand the scope of victim rights are frequently sustained
where this would interfere with defendants’ rights. In State v. Gonzales,
for example, the court held that a victim’s constitutional “right to be
treated with fairness and respect for [her] dignity and privacy” did not
negate a court order allowing the defense to inquire into the victim's use
of alcohol for the purpose of impeachment.196 Doing so would deprive
the defendant of his right to confrontation.197 The scope of the victim’s
right to “fairness” cannot be expanded to destroy the defendant’s right
to a “fair” trial.
Efforts in Illinois to “expand” the scope of expressed victims’ rights
and enforce those rights are largely given similar treatment. Courts will
analyze whether claimed victim’s rights—as enforced or sought to be
enforced—significantly interfere with a defendant’s rights. In People v.
Richardson, for instance, a defendant sentenced to consecutive prison
terms sought a new sentencing hearing.198 He claimed the state’s
presentation of three written “victim-impact statements” at sentencing,
instead of the one permitted under the plain language of the Rights of
Crime Victims and Witnesses Act, prejudiced his trial.199 The Illinois
Supreme Court held that while the circuit court erred in admitting and
considering multiple statements, there was no evidence the statements
unduly prejudiced the defendant’s trial or the sentencing hearing was
rendered fundamentally unfair.200 Thus, even the technical “overexercise” of a victim’s right was sustained in the absence of any
significant infringement of a defendant’s rights.

Harrison, 24 P.3d at 945, 947.
State v. Gonzales, 912 P.2d 297, 299–300 (N.M. Ct. App. 1996).
197
Id. at 299.
198
People v. Richardson, 751 N.E.2d 1104, 1106 (Ill. 2001).
199
Id.; 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. 120/1-9 (2010).
200
Richardson, 751 N.E.2d at 1109; see People v. Willis, 569 N.E.2d 113, 117 (Ill. App. Ct.)
(holding any error in allowing manslaughter victim's cousin, who was outside of statutory
definition of “victim,” to address court regarding impact which defendant's criminal
conduct had upon victim was harmless); People v. Gonzales, 673 N.E.2d 1181, 1183 (Ill.
App. Ct. 1996) (discussing the trial court's alleged error in considering two victim impact
statements in sentencing murder defendant, despite provision in Rights of Crime Victims
and Witnesses Act defining victim as single representative of person killed, was waived
where defense counsel failed to object to consideration of impact statements, as error did
not rise to level of plain error).
195
196
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C. Jurisdictions That Have Implied Victims’ Standing to Vindicate Denial of
Expressed Rights Where There was no Interference with Defendants’
Rights
A few states imply victim standing to enforce expressed rights, but
only where remedies would not conflict with prosecutorial discretion or
the rights of defendants. At the time of the decision in State v.
Timmendequas, for example, New Jersey had a “victims’ rights”
constitutional amendment and enabling statute quite similar to those in
Illinois.201 The New Jersey Constitution provided, inter alia, that “[a]
victim of a crime shall be treated with fairness, compassion and respect
by the criminal justice system.”202 The state Supreme Court held that the
constitutional language, coupled with a victim’s right to be present at
public judicial proceedings without significant inconvenience, gave the
victim standing to seek and obtain the empanelling of a foreign jury
rather than allowing defendant a change of venue.203 The victim’s right
to convenient participation was respected in the absence of any
interference with the defendant’s right to a fair trial.204
In State of New Jersey in the Interest of K.P., the same court held that
the right to make a statement during the dispositional phase of the trial
would be useless and inconsistent with legislative intent without an
implication of standing in the victim to vindicate the right.205 After all,
the courts have the power to prevent a miscarriage of justice, they are the
guardian of rights, and requests for standing to obtain relief are “in pari
materia with the fundamental [constitutional] right to be treated with
fairness, compassion, and respect by the criminal justice system.”206
Those latter terms, said the court, make a victim “a constructive
equivalent to a party in the case[,]” modifying the traditional statedefendant paradigm, at least to the extent necessary to enforce victims’

State v. Timmendequas, 737 A.2d 55, 75–76 (N.J. 1999).
N.J. CONST. art. I, § 22.
203
Id.; Timmendequas, 737 A.2d at 76 (finding the decision not to change venue, but to
empanel foreign jury, did not violate the defendant's constitutional rights since the Victim's
Rights Amendment entitled the parents to fairness and respect, and a provision of the
Crime Victim's Bill of Rights required a minimization of inconveniences). But see State v.
Rymer, No. 99-1521-CR, 2000 WL 1855147, at *5 (Wis. Ct. App. 2000) (declining to rely on
broad victims’ rights provisions to give the victim an interest in change of venue
proceeding) (cited in Douglas E. Beloof, The Third Wave of Crime Victims’ Rights: Standing,
Remedy, and Review, 2005 BYU L. REV. 255, 264).
204
Timmendequas, 737 A.2d at 76.
205
In re the Interest of K.P., 709 A.2d 315, 321 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1997).
206
Id. at 321, 323.
201
202
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rights.207 To rule otherwise would change a victim’s right into a
nullity.208
The constitutions of Arizona and Utah also mandate that victims be
treated with respect and dignity, including the right to refuse to allow
intrusions into private matters.209 In State ex rel. Romley v. Hutt, the
Arizona court denied a defendant's motion to record the interactions
between the victim and the prosecutor, holding that such an intrusion
would create an atmosphere hostile to the intent of the constitutional
provision with regard to victims’ rights.210 The victims’ right to refuse to
be interviewed by the defendant implied victim standing to move to
preclude the requested “recording,” especially where such a ruling did
not implicate the defendant’s right to a fair trial.211 The Florida
constitution, as well, contains similar “fairness” language and allows
victims a right to be heard.212 In Ford v. State, the court granted a victim’s
petition for a writ of certiorari based on the allegation that the state had
not provided adequate notice, causing the victim to forgo restitution.213
It held that those rights implied a right to standing to seek relief with
respect to restitution.214 But here again, allowing standing did not
conflict with the rights of the defendant since double jeopardy is not
violated where a trial court merely increases a sentence to include
restitution.215
Finally, even before their relatively recent passage of a constitutional
“standing amendment,” California courts also interpreted their victims'
rights provisions as implying victim standing.216 In Melissa J. v. Superior
Court, the court granted a victim's petition for a writ of mandamus
because the trial court had ruled in favor of a defendant's post-sentencing
motion to terminate restitution without affording the victim notice and

Id. at 320–21.
Id. at 324. Specifically, if paragraph 22 of Article I of the New Jersey Constitution
cannot be construed to grant standing to victims, then the constitutional amendment lacks
meaning: “the people of New Jersey amended their constitution to grant the legislature
power it already possessed.” Id.
209
ARIZ. CONST. art. 2 § 2.1(1); UTAH CONST. art. I, § 28(a).
210
State ex rel. Romley v. Hutt, 987 P.2d 218, 223 (Ariz. App. Ct. 1999).
211
Id. at 223.
212
FLA. CONST. art. I, § 16(b).
213
Ford v. State, 829 So.2d 946, 948 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2002); see Interest of K.P., 709 A.2d
at 320 (discussing decision in the context of an exception to the general rule of lack of
standing where notice was not given prior to a hearing on distribution of restitution,
restitution being a victim’s right, and therefore the sentence should have been reopened in
all fairness to correct a not otherwise remedial error).
214
Ford, 829 So. 2d at 948.
215
Id.
216
CA. CONST. art. I, § 28(b).
207
208
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opportunity to be heard.217 The court distinguished People v. Superior
Court (Thompson), holding that lack of notice at the original sentencing
hearing did not deprive the trial court of the power to proceed, whereas in
Melissa, the absence of notice occurred during a hearing on a postsentencing motion to terminate restitution, which was invalid without prior
notice to the victim and opportunity for her to be heard.218
In conclusion, fifteen states, including Illinois, have constitutional
language granting victims’ rights through language similar to what is
discussed in this section.219 Eight other states have similar statutory
language executing the constitutional amendment.220 The Illinois statute,
like others, expressly grants victims “[t]he right to be treated with
fairness and respect for their dignity and privacy throughout the
criminal justice process.”221 In several of these states, courts have
implied victim’s standing to vindicate denial of an expressed right, at
least in the absence of interference with the rights of the state or the
defendant.222 The same reasoning would support a similar interpretation
Melissa J. v. Superior Court, 237 Cal. Rptr. 5, 5–7 (Cal. Ct. App. 1987).
Id. at 6; see People v. Superior Court (Thompson), 202 Cal. Rptr. 585, 586–87 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1984) (discussing that the People and victim of a battery that took place on a school
campus separately petitioned for a writ of mandate and/or prohibition alleging that the
order of the Superior Court sentencing the defendant, who had been convicted of
committing the battery, to probation was unlawful in that victim was not notified of the
sentencing date). The Court of Appeals held that the trial court had jurisdiction to proceed
with the sentencing even though victim had not been notified of the date and, as a result,
did not appear. Id.
219
ARIZ. CONST. art. II, § 2.1; IDAHO CONST. art. I, § 22; ILL. CONST. art. I, § 8.1; IND.
CONST. art. I, § 13(b); LA. CONST. art. I, § 25; MICH. CONST. art. I, § 24; MISS. CONST. art. III,
§ 26A; N.J. CONST. art. I, § 22; N.M. CONST. art. II, § 24; OHIO CONST. art. I, § 10a; OKLA.
CONST. art. II, § 34; S.C. CONST. art. I, § 24; TEX. CONST. art. I, § 30; UTAH CONST. art. I, § 28;
VA. CONST. art I, § 8-A.
220
IDAHO CODE ANN. § 19-5306 (2004); 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. 120/2 (2010); IND. CODE § 3540-5-1 (2008); MISS. CODE ANN. § 99-43-1 (2000); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 31-26-2 (2009); S.C.
CODE ANN. § 16-3-1505 (2003); UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-37-1 (LexisNexis 2012); VA. CODE
ANN. § 19.2-11.01 (LexisNexis 2008).
221
725 ILL. COMP. STAT. 120/4(a)(1) (2010).
222
See In re Interest of K.P., 709 A.2d 315, 320 (N.J. 1997) (considering the legislature’s
intent). The court reasoned:
It is difficult for the court to imagine that the Legislature intended to
give victims these expansive rights, yet specifically intended that they
should not be a factor for a court to consider when there is compelling
evidence that a detrimental effect upon a victim will occur if the court
ignored their request. The State contends that the Legislature
specifically identified victims to be considered an interested party with
standing to open a proceeding, and, therefore, the court should
determine that the ability to open suggests standing to close. The court
agrees. The court finds that the legislative intent is more in line with
considering the victim's position as opposed to ignoring it. The court
finds a victim is a constructive equivalent to a party in the case.
217
218
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of the victims’ rights laws in Illinois.223 Indeed, it might be helpful to ask
whether there has been any interference with the administration of
criminal justice, or the rights of defendants, in jurisdictions that have
expressly allowed for victim standing.
VI. THE EXPERIENCE IN JURISDICTIONS THAT EXPRESSLY ALLOW VICTIM
STANDING IN THEIR CONSTITUTIONS OR STATUTES: SELECTED ASSERTIONS
OF SELECTED VICTIM RIGHTS
Several jurisdictions have expressly provided victims standing to
vindicate rights in their state constitutions and laws. New Jersey
amended its state constitution to provide for victims’ rights around the
same time as did Illinois, and initially did not expressly provide for
victim standing to enforce their rights.224 Recently, however, New Jersey
voters gave crime victims standing for this purpose, and for the same
reasons as those leading to recent, successful legislative initiatives for
similar changes in Illinois.225 In addition, two states had earlier granted
similar standing to victims through constitutional amendments—Oregon
and California in 2008.226 The Federal Crime Victim’s Rights Act of 2004,
which inspired this trend, explicitly allows a victim to bring motions in
the district court for relief from denial of rights wherever the criminal
proceedings are being held, and to seek mandamus from the appellate

Id.
725 ILL. COMP. STAT. 120/4(a)(1) (2010) (providing “[t]he right to be treated with
fairness and respect for their dignity and privacy throughout the criminal justice
process . . .”). As an aside, therefore, Section 8.1(d) of the Illinois constitution, stating that
victims’ rights do not create a basis for a defendant to vacate a conviction, need not be read
as prohibiting the implication of standing and intervention of the victim to move to reopen
and renegotiate a conviction to vindicate unfulfilled rights. ILL. CONST. art. I, § 8.1.
224
See supra notes 202–03 (providing the language of New Jersey’s Constitution and the
state’s leading case on the issue).
225
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 52:4B-36 (2012) (declaring that a crime victim has the right “[t]o
appear in any court before which a proceeding implicating the rights of the victim is being
held, with standing to file a motion or present argument on a motion filed to enforce any
right conferred herein or by Article I, paragraph 22 of the New Jersey Constitution, and to
receive an adjudicative decision by the court on any such motion”); Angela Delli Santi, NJ
Gov. Christie Signs Law Aiding Crime Victims, NORTH JERSEY.COM (Aug. 7, 2012, 6:54 P.M.),
available at http://www.northjersey.com/news/crime-and-courts/nj-gov-christie-signslaw-aiding-crime-victims-1.479127, archived at http://perma.cc/83QC-P7MV. (“It literally
addresses most of the issues victims have had problems with over the past [twenty] years
and provides remedies in those areas . . . [f]or example, victims never had direct standing
to come into criminal court and assert their rights. Now they do.”); Press release, Illinois
Attorney General, Senate Vote Puts Crime Victim’s Rights Amendment on November
Ballot (Apr. 10, 2014), available at http://www.ag.state.il.us/pressroom/2014_04/
20140410.html, archived at http://perma.cc/D75G-Y3UZ.
226
CA. CONST. art. I, § 28(b); OR. CONST. art. I, §§ 42, 43.
223
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court to compel the district court to act should it refuse to provide
relief.227 Numerous states have allowed for victim standing by statute.228
Now that sufficient time has passed, and a significant number of
victims’ rights claims have been adjudicated, it would seem useful and
illuminating to review the practical experience in those jurisdictions.
This section discusses the application of a few of the common victims’
rights provisions. Concerning each right, it examines how courts have
resolved questions of defendants’ due process rights arguably denied, or
aspects of prosecutorial discretion allegedly impeded. Hopefully, this
will provide some insight into the extent to which victim standing has in
fact interfered with the due administration of criminal justice.
A.

The Right to Restitution

The statutory right to restitution requires that a victim is entitled to
be made whole as a result of a loss imposed by the defendant.229 Yet,
claims for restitution are occasionally alleged to conflict with a variety of
defendant’s rights, such as the rights to be free from double jeopardy, to
be guaranteed due process of law, or to be free from ex post facto laws. In
People v. Harvest, for example, a defendant was convicted of first and
second-degree murder and was sentenced to a term of years.230
However, the Court of Appeals reversed the second-degree murder
conviction and ordered the prosecution to either retry that charge or
reduce it to voluntary manslaughter.231 The state elected not to retry the
charge, but upon resentencing for voluntary manslaughter—and for the
first time—the trial court ordered restitution.232 The defendant argued
on appeal that he had twice been placed in jeopardy, making the
restitution award unconstitutional.233
The high court disagreed, holding that a victim restitution order was
not punishment for double jeopardy purposes, and that nothing
prevented the government from seeking restitution for the first time at

227
18 U.S.C. § 3771(d)(3)–(4) (2006). In addition, a federal prosecutor can allege that the
district court's erroneous deprivation of a victim’s rights to notice and to be heard is
reversible error. Id.
228
See, e.g., CAL. GOV’T CODE § 6276.01 (West 2008); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 780.751
(West 2007).
229
CAL. PENAL CODE § 1202.4 (West 2004).
230
People v. Harvest, 101 Cal. Rptr. 2d 135, 137 (Cal. Ct. App. 2000).
231
Id.
232
Id.
233
Id.
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resentencing.234 Restitution is compensation, which does not involve an
affirmative disability or restraint, and thus historically has not been
regarded as punishment.235 While victim restitution in the context of a
criminal sentencing, of course, follows from a finding of “a criminal
mind,” this would not preclude a victim from obtaining essentially the
same relief—a civil judgment for money—outside of the criminal
process.236
Similarly, in another California case, a defendant pled guilty to auto
theft.237 He received a suspended sentence and probation, which
included a condition of victim restitution.238 The trial court ultimately
revoked probation, ordered service of a previously imposed sentence of
incarceration, and modified the sentencing order to require payment of
restitution not paid during the term of the now revoked probation.239 On
appeal, the defendant argued that by modifying his sentence the court
increased his punishment in violation of double jeopardy provisions.240
The appellate court held that a sentencing court could modify a
suspended sentence to impose restitution—even if that was not part of
the original sentence—and that such an order did not “increase
punishment” in violation of double jeopardy.241 The clear legislative
intent was that restitution be imposed in all cases unless “compelling
and extraordinary reasons exist to the contrary.”242 No such reasons
existed in this prosecution.243
At issue in People v. Lyon was an alleged conflict between a victim’s
right to restitution and a defendant’s due process right to effective
counsel.244 In that case, a defendant found guilty of embezzlement was
sentenced to five years in prison and was ordered to make victim
restitution, including the victim’s attorney fees.245 The defendant
appealed, arguing that paying attorney’s fees as restitution would
interfere with his right to prepare and present a defense; it would place
an undue burden on counsel's efforts and obligation to provide effective
Id. at 141. Doctrines of waiver, estoppel, and laches were irrelevant. Id. While
estoppel may be invoked against the government, it will not defeat a strong public policy
such as the constitutional mandate for victim restitution. Harvest, 101 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 142.
235
Id. at 140.
236
Id. at 138.
237
People v. Young, 45 Cal. Rptr. 2d 177, 178 (1995).
238
Id.
239
Id. at 178–79.
240
Id. at 179.
241
Id. at 182.
242
Id. at 179.
243
Young, 45 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 182.
244
People v. Lyon, 57 Cal. Rptr. 2d 415, 417 (1996).
245
Id. at 416.
234
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representation.246 Balancing interests, the court held that the order
providing for payment of victims’ legal expenses must be set aside.247
Knowledge by defense counsel that the client, if convicted, could be
charged with these costs would adversely affect the manner, extent, and
degree of counsel’s preparation, and thus “have a chilling effect on the
exercise of [the defendant’s] constitutional right[s].”248
The defendant’s constitutional right to be free from ex post facto laws
was at issue in State v. Clark.249 Clark involved a victim’s appeal from a
criminal restitution order, an appeal in which neither the defendant nor
the prosecution participated.250 The trial court required payment for the
therapy of a minor victim who had been sexually abused.251 Since the
defendant was also sentenced to prison, he had no means to pay those
costs.252 However, since the defendant—who was also a minor—had
been adopted through DCFS, the minor victim requested that DCFS be
ordered to pay the treatment costs.253 The trial court declined to issue
such an order, holding, inter alia, that allowing the appeal would be an ex
post facto law punishing the State.254
B. The Right to be Notified of all Stages of the Judicial Process
The defendant’s right to have the state honor a plea bargain was at
issue in State v. Means.255 A plea agreement was set aside after the
prosecutor notified the court that he had not informed the victim before
the hearing on the plea.256 The defendant then entered into a second plea
agreement with the State, but it was less favorable to him.257 On appeal,
the defendant argued that once an agreement is reached and the
defendant pleads guilty “due process concerns . . . inhibit the ability of
the prosecutor to withdraw from a guilty plea.”258 Prosecutors, he
claimed, should not be able to circumvent a plea agreement where a
defendant has voluntarily and knowingly waived his jury right, the right
to counsel, and the right to cross-examine witnesses.259 The court agreed,
246
247
248
249
250
251
252
253
254
255
256
257
258
259

Id. at 416–17.
Id. at 418.
Id. at 417.
State v. Clark, 251 P.3d 829, 833 (Utah 2011).
Id. at 831.
Id.
Id.
Id.
See id. (refusing to issue the order absent exceptions).
State v. Means, 926 A.2d 328, 333 (N.J. 2007).
Id. at 329.
Id. at 329, 331 (illustrating the first and second plea agreements).
Id. at 333.
Id.
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concluding that while a trial court is obliged to protect a victims’ right to
notice, that right may not be used to impinge on a defendant’s
constitutional rights.260 The lower court should have heard from the
victims on the second plea agreement.261 Had it done so, it would have
been in a better position to decide whether to accept or reject the second
agreement, and the second plea would have been sustained.262
Another interesting case, again presenting arguments of violations of
double jeopardy but suggesting a superior judicial approach to accepting
plea agreements, was State v. Casey, where a defendant charged with
felony aggravated sexual abuse of a child had pled not guilty.263 The
prosecution offered to reduce the charges to a misdemeanor in exchange
for a guilty plea.264 The victim had previously told the prosecutor she
did not want the charges reduced, but the prosecution never informed
the court of her statement.265 At the “change of plea hearing” the plea to
the misdemeanor was accepted and the finding of guilty was entered.266
After the victim asked to speak at sentencing on the misdemeanor the
trial court briefly re-opened the plea, considered what the victim had
said, and then re-affirmed and entered the prior plea agreement.267 The
appellate court held that a victim may deliver a request to be heard at a
change of plea hearing, and that request must be conveyed to the court;
nevertheless, here the trial court had remedied the violation by allowing
the victim to speak at re-sentencing.268 There was little if any delay or
impediment in this prosecution.269
Double jeopardy claims were at issue again in State v. Barrett, where
a defendant pled guilty to stalking.270 He was sentenced without the
Id. at 334.
Means, 926 A.2d at 335.
262
Id. at 335. But see Reed v. Becka, 511 S.E.2d 396, 400 (S.C. Ct. App. 1999) (disregarding
victims input). The state moved to withdraw a plea offer made to a defendant. Id. at 398.
The trial court denied the motion and both the state and the victim's parents appealed. Id.
The defendant claimed he detrimentally relied on the proposed plea agreement but the
victim argued that she was entitled to consult with the prosecutor and “be informed of any
offers to plea bargain” before a plea is entered. Id. at 400 (emphasis added). The court held
that victims do not have a right to veto a plea agreement and, in any event, that the state
may withdraw a plea offer without victim consent. Id. That is, although victims must be
notified of plea offers, that right does not extend to allowing them to reject a proposed offer
or, for that matter, force a prosecutor to trial or back into negotiations. Id.
263
State v. Casey, 44 P.3d 756, 757 (Utah 2002).
264
Id.
265
Id. at 758.
266
Id. at 758–59.
267
Id. at 758.
268
Id. at 767.
269
Casey, 44 P.3d at 762.
270
State v. Barrett, 255 P.3d 472, 476 (Or. 2011).
260
261
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victim being notified of the hearing date.271 The victim petitioned for resentencing because the Oregon Constitutional requirement that she be
notified of and be present at sentencing hearings was not met.272
However, the defendant claimed that resentencing would violate his
double jeopardy rights.273 The trial court recognized that the victim’s
constitutional rights had been violated, but found there was no
remedy.274 The Oregon Supreme Court ruled that the trial court could
resentence as a remedy for the violation of victims’ constitutional rights
because criminal sentencing is “a ruling of a court” as opposed to a
“conviction” or “adjudication.”275 Thus, vacating defendant's sentence
and ordering a resentencing would not be inconsistent with the right to
be free from double jeopardy.276
Similarly, in Hoile v. State, a victim was not notified of a hearing to
reconsider the sentence of her assailant.277 She sought to vacate the
altered sentence on these grounds.278 The trial court granted her request
and the defendant appealed.279 In Maryland, a victim may file an
application for leave to appeal in criminal litigation, but she does not
have a right to appeal unless the decision appealed from substantially
affected her direct interests.280 Here, the assault victim was held entitled
to participate fully in briefing and oral argument because resolution of
the appeal on the merits would affect her direct and substantial
constitutional interests—her statutory rights to be notified, attend, and
be heard at reconsideration hearings.281 There was no impediment to the
defendant’s rights.282
In Ex parte Littlefield, the state’s interest in preserving prosecutorial
discretion was at stake.283 Victims of white collar crimes petitioned for a
writ of mandamus setting aside the guilty plea of a perpetrator with
respect to offenses he committed against several victims because the

Id.
Id.
273
Id.
274
Id. at 474.
275
Id. at 479.
276
Barrett, 255 P.3d at 481.
277
948 A.2d 30, 35 (Md. 2008).
278
Id. at 36.
279
Id.
280
See id. at 39 (interpreting Maryland’s declaration of rights and State statutes).
281
Id. at 42. However, the victim was not entitled to relief in the case because the
legislature had not permitted a victim to seek invalidation of an otherwise legal sentence
merely because the victim’s rights concerning imposition of that sentence had been
violated. Id. at 52.
282
Hoile, 948 A.2d at 44–45.
283
Ex parte Littlefield, 540 S.E.2d 81, 84 (S.C. 2000).
271
272
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petitioning victims, who were not involved in the instant plea, were not
heard on the plea bargain that included only some of the victims.284 The
state argued that if the statutory rights of victims were interpreted to
include every victim of a perpetrator—even those victims’ cases not
prosecuted or part of a plea agreement—prosecutors would suffer an
enormous burden of notification.285 Since the offenses against the
petitioning victims were not included within the guilty plea agreement,
the court held, they were not “victims” with rights to notice and
attendance at the plea bargain hearing.286 Prosecutorial discretion was
sustained against an overly expansive view of the right to be heard.287
C. The Right to be Present at all Stages of the Judicial Process
The defendant’s right to sequester or exclude witnesses before trial
was at issue in State v. Beltran-Felix.288 The prosecutor informed the court
that the victim, who was to testify, wished to be present during the entire
trial.289 The defendant objected, but the court overruled the objection.290
The victim remained in the courtroom throughout the trial and the jury
returned a guilty verdict.291 On appeal, the court held that a rape victim
may remain in the courtroom throughout the trial, and that a defendant
has no constitutional right to the exclusion or sequestration of witnesses
unless, under particular circumstances—such as with a disruptive
witness—the court finds that the victim’s presence may deprive a
defendant of a fair trial.292

Id. at 84–85.
Id. at 85.
286
Id. at 86. But see In re Dean, 527 F.3d 391, 392 (5th Cir. 2008) (recognizing victims have
the right to be a part of the plea agreement). The government told the court in an ex parte
proceeding that it was going to sign a plea agreement with the defendant, and asserted that
due to the number of victims, it would not be practicable to consult with them. Id. The
government argued that notifying the victims would result in extensive media coverage,
which would impair the plea negotiation process and possibly prejudice the case if no plea
was reached. Id. Some of the victims objected to the plea agreement, but the court agreed
with the government's argument, and directed the government to notify all the victims after
the plea agreement had been finalized. Id. at 393. However, on appeal, the court reversed,
and held that the CVRA gave victims the right to confer with prosecutors during the plea
negotiation process, before a plea agreement was reached, and the number of victims did
not render notice to, or conferring with, the victims to be impracticable. Id. at 394–95
(citations omitted).
287
Ex parte Littlefield, 540 S.E.2d 81, 87 (S.C. 2000).
288
State v. Beltran-Felix, 922 P.2d 30, 32 (Utah Ct. App. 1996).
289
Id.
290
Id.
291
Id.
292
Id. at 34.
284
285
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In another case concerning the right to be present, Morehart v. Barton,
a trial court granted the defendant’s motion for an ex parte hearing, but
excluded the prosecution and victim under a state procedural rule that
authorizes their exclusion for certain matters.293 The intent of the ex parte
motion was to address the lack of return of summonses issued as part of
defense counsel's pretrial investigation of mitigation evidence, a motion
opposed by the victim who claimed a right to confidentiality.294 The
murdered victim’s family argued that they were entitled to attend the
hearing because defendant’s counsel would be present.295 The Arizona
Supreme Court held that although victims may have “various rights to
participate in court proceedings that are independent of the defendant’s
right to be present[,]” the family had no constitutional right to attend ex
parte hearings concerning purely procedural matters—whether or not
defense counsel will appear.296 Thus, the court refused to expand the
alleged scope of the victim’s right under these circumstances.297
D. The Right to Offer Victim Impact Statements
In State v. Muhammad, a defendant argued that the “victim impact
statute” violated the provision of the New Jersey Constitution that
prohibited the infliction of cruel and unusual punishment.298 Defendant
argued that the admission of such statements in a capital case, would
likely confuse and “impassion” the jury during sentencing, and thus the
penalty decision would be made in an arbitrary and capricious manner,
rather than on the basis of relevant evidence.299 However, the State
contended that this evidence was relevant because it illustrates each
victim's uniqueness and the nature of the harm caused, and that
deference should be given to the legislative judgment that victim impact
evidence plays a proper role in sentencing.300 The court agreed, finding
that any such statement was not likely to be sufficiently overwhelming
and confusing as to raise cruel and unusual punishment concerns.301
Thus, the victim’s right prevailed over a defendant’s overly broad
interpretation of the scope of his rights.302

293
294
295
296
297
298
299
300
301
302

Morehart v. Barton, 250 P.3d 1139, 1140 (Ariz. 2011).
Id. at 1144.
Id.
Id. at 1145.
Id.
State v. Muhamad, 678 A.2d 164, 170 (N.J. 1996).
Id. at 171.
Id.
Id. at 175.
Id. at 182.
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In another case concerning impact statements, Kenna v. U.S. District
Court for C.D. California, two defendants plead guilty.303 At the first
defendant’s sentencing more than sixty victims submitted written
statements—and several spoke in open court—about the effects of the
crimes.304 At the second defendant's sentencing hearing, the district
judge refused to hear the victims speak in person because he claimed
that he heard them at the other defendant's sentencing and had rereviewed all their statements.305 Kenna, one of the victims, petitioned to
reopen the sentence because he had not been heard, but the Defendant
argued that a victim’s right to be heard during sentencing was limited to
written impact statements.306
The court concluded that "[v]ictims now have an indefeasible right to
speak, similar to that of the defendant,” which was violated when the
victim was not allowed to speak at sentencing.307 The district court
contended that the scope of “[t]he right to be reasonably heard” lay
within judicial discretion.308 The Court of Appeals, however, interpreted
the CVRA's right to be “reasonably heard” as the victims' right to speak in
open court.309 Thus, it would appear, some victims’ rights are sufficiently
important that, on rare occasion, their vindication may involve an
impediment to an expeditious trial, but a reasonable extension of the
sentencing phase after a fair trial.

303
Kenna v. U.S. Dist. Ct. for C.D. Cal., 435 F.3d 1011, 1013 (9th Cir. 2006). On the other
hand, the right of allocution exists only for those who may be defined as proximate
“victims.” See, e.g., In re Antrobus, 519 F.3d 1123, 1125 (10th Cir. 2008) (determining
whether plaintiffs’ daughter is a “victim”). In that case, the accused pleaded guilty to the
transfer of a handgun to a juvenile, who, after reaching the age of eighteen, shot several
people at a shopping center. Id. at 1124. The parents of one of the shooting victims
petitioned the court hearing the transfer of the handgun offense to recognize their daughter as
a victim, enabling the parents of the deceased to be heard at the defendant's sentencing
hearing following conviction of the transfer of handgun offense. Id. The Tenth Circuit
Court of Appeals ruled that the transfer of a handgun was not directly connected to the death
of their daughter. Id. at 1125.
304
Kenna, 435 F.3d at 1013.
305
Id.
306
Id.
307
Id. at 1016.
308
Id. at 1013. This judicial discretion is broad. See, e.g., Sharp v. State, 908 S.W.2d 752,
757 (Mo. Ct. App. 1995) (holding that the more narrow language of the victims’ rights
statute did not bar a victim from testifying as to a specific sentencing recommendation
because the trial court retained broad discretion under common law to receive any
information it deemed relevant to the sentencing process).
309
Kenna, 435 F.3d at 1016.
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E. The Right to Privacy and “Fair” Treatment
The victim’s right to privacy was alleged to conflict with a
defendant’s right to Due Process in, among other cases, State v. Gomez.310
In Gomez, the victim suffered eye damage after being attacked by the
defendant and was evaluated by his own doctor, who made a
diagnosis.311 The trial court ordered that he also be examined noninvasively by a doctor chosen by the defense before trial would
proceed.312 The victim appealed, alleging that the order violated his
right to be “treated with fairness, compassion and respect by the criminal
justice system.”313 The appellate court held that “a trial court may
exercise its inherent authority” in this way.314 However, in an effort to
effectively balance the victim’s right to privacy with the defendant’s
right to a fair trial, the appellate court ruled that there must first be a
showing of a compelling need for the examination—that, for example,
comparable evidence is not available through another source—and that
the benefit to the defendant “clearly outweighs” the hardship or
inconvenience to the victim.315
In a similar situation, also evincing judicial readiness to “fairly”
balance competing interests, a victim with cerebral palsy and
developmental delays was molested by her father.316 He was convicted
of “sexual conduct with a minor.”317 During the sentencing phase, the
310
State v. Gomez, 62 A.3d 933, 935 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2013). See e.g., Day v.
Superior Court, 823 P.2d 82, 83–84 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1991) (sustaining the denial of a theft
defendant's motion for deposition of the victim, based on the Arizona Constitution’s
Victim's Bill of Rights, which precludes the trial court from ordering the deposition of a
victim who has indicated an unwillingness to be interviewed by the defense, despite the
rule of criminal procedure that permits a trial judge to exercise discretion to order the
deposition of a material witness in certain circumstances); State v. O'Neil, 836 P.2d 393,
394–95 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1991) (concluding that the lower court’s order for the state to record
all statements made by the victims to the prosecutor and provide defense counsel with
copies of the transcripts would enable the defendant to make an end run around the
constitutional right conferred on victims to refuse any discovery requests by, in essence,
permitting the defendant to obtain an interview of the victims). But see State v. Blackmon,
908 P.2d 10, 12 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1995) (finding that the defendant had the right to crossexamine the victim at her “victim impact statement” because the Victim's Bill of Rights did
not abolish the pre-existing rule that the defendant had a due process right to question
victims who testified at pre-sentence hearings).
311
Gomez, 62 A.3d at 934–35.
312
Id. at 935.
313
Id. at 939.
314
Id. at 940.
315
Id. at 939 (emphasis added).
316
See P.M. v. Gould, 136 P.3d 223, 225, 231 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2006) (demonstrating that the
trial court has the best opportunity to balance the interests of the parties).
317
Id. at 225.
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state informed the court that it intended to call the victim’s counselor as
a witness to prove the aggravating factor of emotional harm.318 The
defendant subpoenaed the counseling records to prepare for crossexamination of the counselor, and the trial court ordered an in camera
review of the records.319 The victim appealed, seeking to protect her
privacy by preventing production of those records.320 The appellate
court held that the defendant had a right to information “essential to the
preparation of a defense,” and that where the victim's counselor-patient
privilege is at odds with the defendant's due process right, “the
defendant's due process right is the ‘superior right.’”321 As suggested in
Gomez, however, the lower court should first determine whether the
records were essential to the state’s efforts. The appellate court found
that they were not.322 The state already had proof of six aggravating
factors, yet only one was needed for an “aggravated” sentence.323
Therefore, the victim’s privacy was preserved without interference with
defendant’s due process rights or prosecutorial discretion.
A victim’s right to privacy was alleged to interfere with a
defendant’s right to appellate review in State v. Bray.324 After his
conviction for rape and other related offenses, the defendant filed a
motion seeking to preserve the victim's computer hard drive in the
record under seal for purposes of appellate review.325 The victim
claimed that this would violate her statutory right to “refuse . . . [a]
discovery request by the criminal defendant.”326 The trial court granted
the defendant's motion, however, and the victim filed an interlocutory
appeal.327 The appellate court maintained the defendant’s due process
rights by holding, inter alia, that the order to place the victim's hard drive
under seal to protect defendant's appellate rights did not constitute
“compelled discovery” in violation of the victim's right to refuse
discovery because:

Id.
Id. at 225–26.
320
Id. at 225.
321
Id. at 226.
322
Gould, 136 P.3d at 231.
323
Id. at 230. Further, even if the trial court found that the state’s interest in calling the
counselor was compelling, it should have then considered whether the records were really
necessary for cross-examination. Id. at 232.
324
See State v. Bray, 291 P.3d 727, 730 (Or. 2012) (discussing how the victim’s right to
privacy conflicted with the defendant’s right to appellate review).
325
Id.
326
Id. at 733.
327
Id. at 731.
318
319
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[T]he issue at this stage of the case . . . is not whether
defendant was entitled to have the cloned hard drive
produced before or during trial. The victim has already
won that point: The trial court refused to give defendant
access to the hard drive. . . . [T]he trial court ordered
only that the victim deliver an existing hard drive clone
so that it could be placed under seal in the trial court
file. . . . [T]he trial court order does not require the
disclosure of any information relating to the litigation to
anyone. Regardless of what the exact boundaries of
“discovery” may be . . . defendant’s request . . . for
purposes of appellate review, and the trial court's order
allowing that request, [does] not qualify.328
There is also a decision in which a victim’s right to privacy has been
alleged to interfere with a defendant’s right to confront witnesses under
the Sixth Amendment. A defendant filed a motion in State v. Gilchrist
“for an order directing the prosecutor to provide the defense with a
photograph” of the victim to allow him to cross-examine her.329 The
victim argued that this would violate her right to be “treated with
fairness, compassion[,] and respect by the criminal justice system.”330
The court held that the victim did not have to provide the photograph
because the defendant failed to show how it was relevant to his claim of
innocence, and that any possible benefit to the defendant was
outweighed by the victim’s right to privacy, fairness, and respect.331
F.

The Right to be Heard on Appeal

Exercise of this right, may conflict with prosecutorial discretion
regarding such decisions. In State v. Bradley, for example, a victim filed
criminal complaints against two individuals.332 The prosecutor filed a
complaint against one, but refused to pursue the other for lack of
probable cause.333 The victim moved to reverse this decision.334 The
court found that the victim had no standing to do so because he was not
a “prosecuting attorney” as required by the appellate court rules.335 The
victim argued on appeal that New Jersey law does not prevent a private
328
329
330
331
332
333
334
335

Id.
State v. Gilchrist, 885 A.2d 29, 31 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2005).
Id. at 34–35.
Id. at 35.
State v. Bradley, 19 A.3d 479, 480 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2011).
Id.
Id.
Id.
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litigant from initiating proceedings by filing complaints and, at that
stage, there is no need for a “prosecuting attorney.”336 The State
countered that the sound “public policy behind the limitation on who
may act as a ‘prosecuting attorney’ is well-established.”337 In addition,
“[u]nlike private citizens, prosecutors are . . . governed by the Rules of
Professional Conduct[,] and their decisions are calculated] to ensure
fairness in the process.”338 The appellate court agreed, ruling that it is a
matter of prosecutorial discretion as to whether it’s in the public’s
interest to appeal, and a victim cannot appeal an exercise of prosecutorial
discretion.339 This is a typical situation in which prosecutors have not
been “swayed,”—did not deviate from their ethical duty—as a result of a
victim’s participation in the process.
In conclusion, given the decisions reviewed in this section—
involving as they do the resolution of actual disputes or conflicts
between victims seeking enforcement of rights, and assertions of
defendants’ rights or claims of prosecutorial discretion—it is fair to
conclude that state courts have no difficulty in fairly and expeditiously
balancing the interests of all participants in resolving these disputes over
the extent of victims’ rights. There is no indication in this precedent that
efforts to enforce victims’ rights have interfered in any significant way
with the expeditious and fair administration of criminal justice.
VII. ANALYSIS
The 1970s witnessed a social movement focused on the status of
crime victims in the criminal justice system. It was described as “one of
the most successful civil liberties movements of recent times.”340 The
“movement” flowed in part from academic studies indicating the
negative effects of crime on victims and their dissatisfaction with the
criminal justice system, both of which directly impacted the willingness
Id. at 481.
Id.
338
Bradley, 19 A.3d at 481. See, e.g., Taliaferro v. Locke, 6 Cal. Rptr. 813, 816 (1960) (noting
that the prosecutor is bound by the law and professional ethics controlling all counsel).
These decisions go beyond safety and redress for an individual victim; they involve "the
complex considerations necessary for the effective and efficient administration of law
enforcement." People v. Keenan, 758 P.2d 1081, 1098 (Cal. 1988) (quoting People v. Heskett,
30 Cal. 3d 841, 860 (1982)).
339
Bradley, 19 A.3d at 482. See, e.g., Reed v. Becka, 511 S.E.2d 396, 400 (S.C. Ct. App. 1999)
(holding that a victim did not have the right to veto a plea agreement and force a
prosecutor to trial or back into negotiations; the prosecutor has unfettered discretion in this
regard).
340
Boland & Butler, supra note 51, at 5 (quoting John W. Gillis & Douglas E. Beloof, The
Next Step for a Maturing Victims Rights Movement: Enforcing Crime Victim Rights in the
Courts, 33 MCGEORGE L. REV. 689, 691 (2002)).
336
337
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of victims to report crimes and cooperate in their prosecution.341 As a
result, after overwhelming public and legislative support, the Illinois
Constitution was amended in 1993 to provide a substantial list of
victims’ rights.342 This was followed by legislation executing that
constitutional provision.343
However, the enforcement of victims’ rights in most states, including
Illinois, was delegated solely to prosecutors, who have often failed—or
at least are thought by victims to have failed—in their statutory duty of
enforcement due to inadvertent nonfeasance or, occasionally,
“erroneous” exercises of prosecutorial discretion.344 Yet, regardless of

See Davis, supra note 49 (analyzing the history of the criminal justice system).
See ILL. CONST. art. 1, § 8.1(a) (enumerating the rights for crime victims). Article I,
Section 8.1(a) of the Illinois Constitution guarantees crime victims ten basic rights “as
provided by law”:
(1) The right to be treated with fairness and respect for their dignity
and privacy throughout the criminal justice process. (2) The right to
notification of court proceedings. (3) The right to communicate with
the prosecution. (4) The right to make a statement to the court at
sentencing. (5) The right to information about the conviction, sentence,
imprisonment, and release of the accused. (6) The right to timely
disposition of the case following the arrest of the accused. (7) The right
to be reasonably protected from the accused throughout the criminal
justice process. (8) The right to be present at the trial and all other
court proceedings on the same basis as the accused, unless the victim is
to testify and the court determines that the victim's testimony would
be materially affected if the victim hears other testimony at the trial.
(9) The right to have present at all court proceedings, subject to the
rules of evidence, an advocate or other support person of the victim's
choice. (10) The right to restitution.
Id. The Illinois Constitution also provides that “[t]he General Assembly may provide by
law for the enforcement of this section.” Id.; see Parness et al., supra note 3, at 73–74 (stating
the House approved a unanimous vote, and the public passed the amendment with a threefourths vote).
343
See supra note 6 (describing the enacted legislation).
344
See supra note 17 (describing the failure of the prosecutors in fulfilling their duty of
enforcement); 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. 120/4.5(a)–(b) (2010) (delegating the rights to the state’s
attorney); see also 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. 120/9 (setting out the scope of the Act). The Act
states:
This Act does not limit any rights or responsibilities otherwise enjoyed
by or imposed upon victims or witnesses of violent crime, nor does it
grant any person a cause of action for damages or attorneys fees. Any
act of omission or commission by any [person or entity] acting in good
faith in rendering crime victim's assistance or otherwise enforcing this
Act shall not impose civil liability upon the individual or entity or his
or her supervisor or employer. Nothing in this Act shall create a basis
for vacating a conviction or a ground for appellate relief in any
criminal case. Failure of the crime victim to receive notice as required,
however, shall not deprive the court of the power to act regarding the
341
342

Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2015

Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 49, No. 3 [2015], Art. 7

654

VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 49

whether or not prosecutors conform to their statutory duty, many issues
will inevitably arise during a criminal prosecution where a victim will
have important concerns regarding the way her statutory rights have
been implemented or protected.345 Victims’ interests may or may not
coincide with those of prosecutors or defendants.346 In these situations,
victims should at least have standing to request judicial assistance in
resolving these perceived conflicts.
The legal justification for allowing victim standing can be found,
first, through reasonable statutory interpretation of existing victims’
rights provisions.347 Second, by analogy to the persuasive jurisprudence
proceeding before it; nor shall any such failure grant the defendant the
right to seek a continuance.
Id.
345
See, e.g., Gina Warren, Due Process—Prosecutorial Implications of a Victim's Right to be
Heard: Court Upholds Victim's Right to be Heard at Important Justice Hearings: State v. Casey,
44 P.3d 756 (Utah 2002), 34 RUTGERS L.J. 1173, 1184–85 (noting the importance in protecting
the defendant’s due process and liberty rights).
346
See, e.g., William T. Pizzi, Victims' Rights: Rethinking our "Adversary System,” 1999
UTAH L. REV. 349, 349 (1999) (“The Victims' Rights Amendment carries with it formal
acknowledgment that victims of violent crime have a stake in the trial that is different from
that of the general public or even the prosecutor.”). Even where the interests of the state
and the victim are consistent in a given case, the legislature should still consider enacting a
requirement that prosecutors file forms in court files evidencing compliance with their
statutory duties and verifying that victims’ rights have been noticed or respected. See, e.g.,
UNIF. TRIAL CT. RULES 31–40 (2010), available at http://courts.oregon.gov/OJD/
docs/programs/utcr/2010_UTCR.pdf,
archived
at
http://perma.cc/C4CY-WBRC
(describing the prosecuting attorney’s notification of compliance with crime victims’
constitutional rights for adults and delinquents). In addition, it might be fruitful to enact
by legislation proof of notice forms, template pleadings and orders for use in requesting
and granting victim intervention.
347
This is the case due to the rules of statutory construction in Illinois. See supra Part III
(implying victim standing to assert and vindicate their unenforced rights as a matter of
statutory interpretation). For example, the Illinois statute, like others, expressly requires
that victims have “[t]he right to be treated with fairness and respect for their dignity and
privacy throughout the criminal justice process.” 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. 120/4(a)(1) (2010).
In New Jersey, the court found that this same overarching right in its constitution implied
standing to vindicate denial of other individually expressed rights, at least in the absence of
interference with the rights of the state or the defendant. See, e.g., In re the Interest of K.P.,
709 A.2d 315, 320 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1997) (discussing the legislative intent regarding
victim’s rights). The court stated:
It is difficult for the court to imagine that the Legislature intended to
give victims these expansive rights, yet specifically intended that they
should not be a factor for a court to consider when there is compelling
evidence that a detrimental effect upon a victim will occur if the court
ignored their request. The State contends that the Legislature
specifically identified victims to be considered an interested party with
standing to open a proceeding, and, therefore, the court should
determine that the ability to open suggests standing to close. The court
agrees. The court finds that the legislative intent is more in line with
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in other jurisdictions that have not expressly granted victim standing as a
matter of law, but where standing has been implied.348 Finally, victim
standing seems unproblematic given positive judicial experience with
existing “victim standing” provisions in a significant number of other
states and under federal law.349 While arguments have been advanced
about the potential negative impact of victim intervention—or, more
accurately, victim “participation”—on both defendants’ constitutional
rights and prosecutorial discretion, most of these arguments flow from a
misguided sense of the effect of “victim standing” provisions.350 There
had been a misperception that these provisions would create an
additional “party” in criminal proceedings, one capable of impeding the
criminal process by making it more complex or time-consuming, or of
interfering with defendants’ constitutional rights.
In fact, victims’ standing to vindicate or protect their own rights—or
at least their conception of those rights—has been shown in practice to be
closely limited to that purpose, and there is generally no significant
interference with or impediment to prosecutorial discretion or the
defendant’s due process rights.351 The victim’s standing is often based
on the implied or expressed purposes of victims’ rights laws and
practically all potential conflicts over assertions of these rights—either in
those states with or without victim standing as a matter of positive law—
and has been rationally and expeditiously resolved by criminal trial
courts.352 There is no reason to believe this will not also be the case in
Illinois.
Consequently, legislative and political efforts were made to amend
the Illinois Constitution specifically to provide crime victims with
considering the victim’s position as opposed to ignoring it. The court
finds a victim is a constructive equivalent to a party in the case.
Id. The same reasoning would support a similar interpretation of the victims’ rights laws of
Illinois.
348
See supra Part V (interpreting the implied standing in states without express victim
standing provisions).
349
See supra Part V (discussing the complication with the defendants’ right to a speedy
trial and victims contesting violations of their rights).
350
See supra notes 5, 17–21 and accompanying text (analyzing the arguments over victim
intervention). It should also be noted that the important principle of prosecutorial
discretion should not be extended to include discretion regarding a statutory duty to
enforce a victim’s statutory rights, especially where a victim continues to be vulnerable to
further violence. See Kathryn E. Litchman, Punishing the Protectors: The Illinois Domestic
Violence Act Remedy for Victims of Domestic Violence Against Police Misconduct, 38 LOY. U.
CHI. L.J. 765, 772–74 (2007) (noting that the recidivism rate of domestic abuse is particularly
high but quantifying the prevalence is difficult).
351
See supra Parts V–VI (contrasting between states that allow and disallow victim
standing provisions).
352
See supra Part IV (providing the jurisprudence on victim standing).
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standing to participate in criminal prosecutions for the limited purpose
of protecting their statutory rights.353 Fortunately, although passage of
such a constitutional amendatory act was thwarted in the last Illinois
legislative session, the legislature was committed to enacting victim
standing.354 The amendatory bill was again introduced in March of 2014,
and passed as a joint resolution on May 30, 2014.355 It seeks to allow
crime victims to be participants in the process, rather than merely to
have a voice in the criminal proceedings.356 This action was thought
necessary, of course, because state courts generally hold that victims, not
being “parties” to criminal prosecutions, do not automatically have
standing to intervene to challenge denied rights or interests.357 Yet,
inevitably, there continue to be perceived conflicts between the asserted
scopes of statutory rights asserted by victims and exercises of
prosecutorial discretion or demands for protection of a defendant’s due
process rights.
Separate causes of action for injunctive relief under these
circumstances, a legislatively suggested alternative, would be an
inefficient and ineffective remedy for violations of crime victims’ rights.
See, e.g., Amendment, supra note 7 (describing the house resolution proposing an
amendment to the Illinois Constitution to give more rights to crime victims).
354
See supra notes 17–21 and accompanying text (raising concerns about offering victims
a role in the traditional two-party criminal justice process); Weinhold, supra note 1, at 1.
The pending amendment would, inter alia, add the following section to the original
constitutional list of rights: “(b) A victim, the victim's lawyer, or the prosecuting attorney
may assert the rights enumerated in subsection (a) in any court with jurisdiction over the
case as a matter of right. The court shall act promptly on the request.” Amendment, supra
note 7 (emphasis added); see also Illinois Victims’ Rights Amendment Stalls after Sudden
Turnaround in Legislative Support, supra note 8 (noting that the committee killed the bill
before the deadline).
355
See H.R.J. Res. No. 103, 98th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ill. 2014), available at
http://www.ilga.gov/legislation/BillStatus.asp?DocNum=103&GAID=12&DocTypeID=H
JR&LegId=82477&SessionID=85&GA=98, archived at http://perma.cc/WP2D-QX24
(describing that the bill was adopted by both houses on May 30, 2014).
356
See Boland & Butler, supra note 51, at 9 (addressing the victim’s role in the criminal
justice process).
357
See, e.g., Dix v. Superior Court, 807 P.2d 1063, 1067 (Cal. 1991) (holding that crime
victims do not have the right to appeal the sentence imposed); Cooper v. District Court, 133
P.3d 692, 696 (Alaska Ct. App. 2006) (rejecting various arguments that victim had standing
to seek appellate review of sentencing error and her right to have part of a sentencing
hearing sealed); Lamb v. Kontgias, 901 A.2d 860, 869 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2006) (holding
victim was not party to criminal prosecution and did not have standing to appeal lack of
notice and opportunity to speak at hearing to reconsider sentence); In re State ex rel.
Sistrunk, 142 S.W.3d 497, 502 (Tex. Ct. App. 2004) (holding victim's family had no standing
to challenge defendant's sentence or procedures at sentencing hearing); Commonwealth v.
Malloy, 450 A.2d 689, 694 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1982) (holding that the criminal victim was not a
party to the criminal prosecution and did not have standing to appeal the decision
dismissing complaint).
353
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This is, no doubt, why few, if any, independent or separate actions of
this sort have been filed since the effective date of the victims’ rights
provisions in Illinois. The most effective remedy for denied victims’
rights—and for resolving such conflicts—is direct, limited victim
participation. That is, crime victims, when necessary, should be able to
assert their statutory rights by moving directly and immediately for
specific relief as part of and during the criminal prosecution. It would be
odd to conclude that victims should in any way be denied this ability to
seek such relief in this most efficient and effective manner. The courts,
after all, have the power to prevent a miscarriage of justice, they are the
guardian of rights, and thus requests for standing to obtain relief are “in
pari materia with the fundamental right [victims’ constitutional right in
most states,] to be treated with fairness, compassion, and respect by the
criminal justice system.”358
Those latter phrases have been held to make a victim a constructive
equivalent to a party in the case, and may seem to modify the traditional
state-defendant paradigm, but they “participate” only for the limited
purposes of vindicating victims’ statutory rights.359 To administer
criminal justice otherwise would change victims’ constitutional and
statutory rights into a nullity.360 Thus, it was quite appropriate for the
Illinois voters to ratify the recent constitutional amendatory bill granting
victims standing for the purpose of enforcing their rights.
VIII. CONCLUSION
Illinois courts are already free to use their inherent equitable power
to enforce the rights of victims by allowing victims standing to directly
petition for vindication of denied rights during prosecutions. In the
alternative—perhaps because the judiciary has been reluctant to make
such implications in the absence of legislative support, and because
In re Interest of K.P., 709 A.2d 315, 321 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1997).
See 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. 120/4.5(b)(9) (2010) (implicating the requirements of the
prosecutor). The statute provides that the prosecutor:
[S]hall inform the victim of the right to have present at all court
proceedings, subject to the rules of evidence, an advocate or other
support person of the victim's choice, and the right to retain an attorney,
at the victim's own expense, who, upon written notice filed with the
clerk of the court and State's Attorney, is to receive copies of all
notices, motions and court orders filed thereafter in the case, in the
same manner as if the victim were a named party in the case[.]
Id. (emphasis added).
360
See id (enumerating the victims’ constitutional rights). Specifically, if the New Jersey
Constitution cannot be construed to grant standing to victims then the constitutional
amendment lacks meaning: “the people of New Jersey amended their constitution to grant
the Legislature power it already possessed.” In re Interest of K.P., 709 A.2d at 324.
358
359

Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2015

Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 49, No. 3 [2015], Art. 7

658

VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 49

authority in other states supports the efficacy of such an amendment—
the Illinois voters wisely ratified a constitutional “victims’ standing
amendment” accomplishing the same goal as judicial implication. The
legislature has indicated its inclination to do so in the past, and, given
the continuing dissatisfaction on the part of crime victims with the extent
of their current participation in the criminal process, it was wise to
finally enact and have ratified such an amendment.361 The Illinois
judiciary, as has been shown through precedent in other states with
victim standing, should be more than capable of guarding against any
possible “impediments” to defendant’s rights or prosecutorial discretion.
Further, given the ongoing possibility of prosecutorial nonfeasance—
especially given expanding caseloads—independent victim standing is
necessary to guarantee victims’ rights.362 The Illinois legislature and
voters exercised good judgment in passing the Victims’ Standing
Constitutional Amendment.

361
See supra notes 40–62 with accompanying text (describing the dissatisfaction of the
crime victims).
362
See supra notes 17–21, 42 with accompanying text (describing the crime victims’
participation in the criminal process).
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